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Abstract 
Though economists have carried out extensive research to examine regional 
disparities in China, they often neglect intra-provincial inequalities. To fill this lacuna, 
this study attempts to disentangle the forces shaping disparities across prefectures in 
Guangdong that have experienced disparate economic performances. 
In this study, the intra-provincial inequalities in Guangdong are first explored 
through the lens of convergence analysis. The results indicate that ^-convergence has 
not happened among Guangdong's prefectures during the period 1980-2001. In other 
words, intra-provincial inequalities have been widening over time. Next, there is 
conditional yS^convergence but no unconditional /^convergence in Guangdong. Since 
two types of /^-convergence do not coincide, the steady-state output per capita levels are 
not equivalent across different prefectures in Guangdong. 
In order to account for Guangdong's intra-provincial disparities, the study 
estimates a growth equation proposed by Barro (1991) through regressing the growth 
rate of output per capita on initial GDP per capita and a set of explanatory variables such 
as the investment ratio and share of primary sector. Our empirical results demonstrate 
that openness, fiscal decentralization, rate of change of investment ratio and Deng's tour 
exert positive impacts on growth, while unfavorable geographical location and rate of 
change of primary share affect growth adversely. These findings have important policy 
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1.1 Motivation and Issues 
There have long been heated debates on the tradeoff between equity and 
efficiency with respect to China's regional policies. The reform in 1978 is often 
perceived to have boosted the economy at the expense of equity. To precisely examine 
whether there is a widening of regional disparities in China after the reform, extensive 
research has been carried out. However, these studies are limited to investigating inter-
provincial inequali t ies�The issue of intra-provincial inequalities, another important 
aspect of regional disparities, is less thoroughly investigated in previous studies^ To fill 
this gap, this study attempts to examine the intra-provincial inequalities in a particular 
province, Guangdong. 
Is the intra-provincial disparity in Guangdong widening after the reform? If this 
is the case, do the three sets of factors related to geography, openness and fiscal 
decentralization account for the upward trend? To answer these questions, this study 
performs an empirical investigation based on the data of twenty-one Guangdong's 
prefectures^ To be precise, a-convergence in Guangdong is first examined using two 
inequality measures, viz., the coefficient of variation and Theil's entropy measure. Next, 
1 See, for example, Chen and Fleisher (1996), Demurger (2001)，Lyons (1991), Jian et al. (1996)，Tsui 
(1991’）Tsui and Wang (2002) and Weeks and Yao (2003). 
2 Song'et al. (2000) and Jones et al. (2003) employ the data of urban cities to examine intra-provincial 
disparities in China, while Lyons (1998) investigates a similar issue using the county-level data. 
3 In this Study, cr-convergence and unconditional ^^-convergence are examined using the data for the period 
1980 -2001, while conditional ；^-convergence is examined using the data for a shorter period 1980-1998 
due to data limitation. 
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unconditional and conditional /^-convergence are measured through estimating a growth 
equation proposed by Barro (1991). More importantly and as a corollary to the above 
analysis, this study examines factors related to geography, openness and fiscal 
decentralization that are pertinent to economic growth.* 
Among all provinces of China, Guangdong is selected for this study. Since the 
1980s, it has undergone monumental changes with the introduction of reforms. 
Guangdong has climbed up the ladder of economic success and surpassed many other 
provinces. It is thus interesting to investigate whether there is any tradeoff between 
efficiency and equity through exploring the trend of intra-provincial disparities in 
Guangdong. To familiarize with the special features of this province, its economic 
development is discussed below. 
Guangdong is located on the southern periphery of China. This coastal location, 
however, did not bring many advantages to it in the pre-reform era. First, under the 
threat of foreign attack, the central government did not stress their capital construction in 
Guangdong. Together with the American embargo that substantially cut off its contact 
) 
with the West, Guangdong was a rather stagnant economy during the Maoist period. 
Between 1952 and 1978，its national income grew relatively slowly at an average annual 
rate of 5.3 per cent.^ 
The situation has become totally different after the return of Deng in 1978. 
Guangdong was one step ahead of other provinces to undergo economic reform (Vogel 
(1989)). Since 1978，a series of special policies have been implemented there. For 
4 Similar investigation is carried out, e.g., in Rodrik et al. (2002), except that they regress the log of 
income per capita on the measures of geography, openness and institutions. 
5 See Chu and Yeung(1994). 
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instance, three of the four special economic zones were established to attract foreign 
businesses. In addition to adopting the open door policy, decentralization of fiscal 
powers from the central to provincial government has taken place in Guangdong. For 
instance, during the period 1980-1984, it was only obliged to remit a lump sum of 1 
billion yuan to the central government each year, as stipulated in the central-provincial 
fiscal contract. Moreover, Guangdong could retain 70 per cent of the above-baseline 
foreign exchange earnings from exports and has acquired the power to approve 
investment projects that are under 100 million yuan (See e.g. Maruya (1992) and Chu 
and Yeung (1994)). 
After the implementation of these preferential policies, Guangdong has become 
the largest recipient of foreign direct investment, thereby experiencing fast economic 
growth. Between 1980 and 1990，it achieved an average annual GDP growth of 12.3 per 
cent^. However, the pace of growth is perceived to be uneven among different regions in 
Guangdong. For instance, notwithstanding the large inflow of foreign investment to the 
Pearl River Delta, mountainous regions remain undeveloped after the reform. In 1991’ 
the mountainous areas, which comprised up to 63 per cent of the population in 
Guangdong, contributed only to 15.8 per cent of the provincial GDP?. To understand 
why Guangdong's intra-provincial disparities were changing over time, the rest of this 
study rigorously performs an empirical analysis using prefectural data. 
6 See Chu and Yeung (1994). 
7 See Hook (1996). 
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1.2 Contributions 
According to our previous discussion, intra-provincial inequalities are seldom 
investigated in the existing literature. By adopting similar analytical framework of 
previous studies (e.g. Barro (1991)) and extending their works from the provincial to 
prefectural level, this research contributes to the study of China's intra-provincial 
inequalities. In so far as the reasons underlying the disparate economic performances 
across Guangdong's prefectures are identified, important policy implications may be 
drawn from these findings. 
Though there are numerous studies exploring how geography, openness and 
institutions determine the economic performances, they predominantly regress the level 
of income per capita on the three factors (See e.g. Alcala and Ciccone (2002)，Easterly 
and Levine (2002)，Hall and Jones (1999) and Rodrik et al. (2002)). As discussed in this 
literature, openness and institutions may be endogenous in the model. To address this 
problem, they employ either two-stage least square or generalized method of moments 
estimation. From their empirical results, geography is statistically insignificant after 
controlling for institutions. This research contributes by evaluating the impact of 
geography, openness and institutions on growth using another approach. A growth 
equation proposed by Barro (1991) is estimated in this study. To tackle the problem of 
endogeneity, we select proxies which are less likely to be determined by the rate of 
economic growth. For instance, a dummy of Pearl River Delta is introduced in our 
model to reflect the degree of openness. Moreover, the Hausman specification test is 
carried out for checking the consistency of least square estimators. Unlike previous 
4 
studies, this study suggests that geography, openness and institutions are all affecting 
• . g 
growth performances significantly . 
This paper is organized as follows. The next chapters explores the geographical 
characteristics, degree of openness and fiscal decentralization in Guangdong, while 
chapter 3 reviews the literature. Methodology and estimation issues are explained in 
chapter 4 and 5 respectively. Chapter 6 presents and interprets the estimation results. 
Finally, chapter 7 summarizes the empirical findings and discusses the policy 
implications. 
8 The result for openness, however, is not robust. The estimated coefficient is statistically significant only 
if an exogenous proxy, DELTA is used in the estimation. 
5 
Chapter Two 
Overview of Guangdong 
As stated earlier, this thesis studies intra-provincial disparities in Guangdong and 
explores the extent to which the differential growth rates among the prefectures may be 
due to a set of factors related to geography, openness and fiscal decentralization on 
growth. In recent years, there is a growing literature trying to find out how crucial these 
factors are in driving economic growth between countries (e.g. Alcala and Ciccone 
(2002)，Easterly and Levine (2002)，Hall and Jones (1999) and Rodrik et al. (2002)). 
According to this literature, there are different channels through which geography, 
openness and fiscal decentralization may affect economic performance. For example, 
geography contributes to growth through affecting agricultural productivity, 
transportation costs and trade volume (Demurger et al. (2002)). Openness may enhance 
technological spillover and bring in competition, resulting in an improvement in the 
efficiency of domestic enterprises (Yao and Zhang (2001)). Since local governments, 
which have more information about local tastes, can cater better to local needs, fiscal 
decentralization may lead to improvement in resources allocation (Lin and Liu (2000)). 
One step ahead of other provinces, Guangdong is a particularly interesting case to assess 
the importance of the above factors on growth. Not only does Guangdong's physical 
terrain vary greatly from the fertile Pearl River Delta to the mountainous north, different 
policies with respect to openness and fiscal decentralization potentially important to 
local economic growth have been granted to different prefectures within the province. 
As a prelude to our subsequent empirical analysis, this chapter is an overview of 
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Guangdong along such dimensions as geographical characteristics, foreign trade and 
investment, fiscal contracts and township and village enterprises. Such a discussion 
paves the way for constructing proxies for geography, openness and fiscal 
decentralization pertinent to our empirical analysis. 
2.1 Geography 
In China, the government administration is comprised of five tiers: (1) central; (2) 
province; (3) prefecture; (4) county and (5) township. Our study focuses on the 
prefectural level of governments. Under this administrative hierarchy, there are 
altogether twenty-one prefectures controlled by the provincial government of 
Guangdong (See table 2.1 for the list of Guangdong's prefectures). Each of the 
prefectural governments is responsible for the administrative control over some urban 
areas, counties and county-level cities. Since this study is an attempt to understand the 
different pace of economic expansion between Guangdong's prefectures, this section 
first looks into the geographical characteristics of different prefectures. 
Guangdong is situated on the southern periphery of China, adjacent to Hong 
Kong and Macau. It is rather small in size, with an area of 177901 kml Though the 
province occupies only 1.85 per cent of China's total area, it coastline, which amounts to 
3368 km, is the longest among all provinces. 
The warm and moist climate in Guangdong is favorable to its agricultural 
development. There are around two to ten typhoons hitting the province each year, 
bringing in a sufficient amount of rainfall. Accordingly, the average annual rainfall 
ranges from 1400mm to 2100 mm in Guangdong. In addition, with its location in the 
sub-tropical and tropical zone, the average annual temperature is comparatively high in 
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this province. It ranges from 19°C in the north to 24�C in the south. While the Nan Ling 
mountains, which lie on its northern boundary, restrict cold winds from blowing into the 
province, there are only two frost months in the north and almost none in the south. 
Under these desirable conditions, triple cropping may be practiced in Guangdong (Hook 
(1996)). 
Notwithstanding the minor differences in climatic conditions from north to south, 
physical landscape is quite diverse within the province. About two-third of Guangdong 
is made up of mountains, while tablelands and plains only account for 13 and 25 per cent 
of total area respectively. In general, the more distant the area from coast, the higher is 
its elevation (See table 2.1). 
Prefectures located in the northern part of Guangdong, such as Qingyuan, 
Meizhou and Shaoguan, predominantly consist of mountains (See figure 2.1). For 
example, as reported in table 2.1，Meizhou and Shaoguan both have eight counties 
classified as mountainous. Though they are rich in mineral resources compared to other 
areas，the high elevation of mountains may render their economic development difficult. 
For instance, the rugged terrain may raise the transportation costs of raw materials and 
thereby reduce the profitability of domestic firms. Moreover, the acidic and infertile soil 
in the north may probably give rise to low agricultural productivity (Hook (1996)). 
Unlike mountains and hills, flatlands are concentrated in the southern part of 
Guangdong. In particular, the Pearl River Delta, which is formed by the East, West and 
North river, is the largest plain in Guangdong. There are nine prefectures including 
Dongguan, Foshan, Guangzhou, Huizhou, Jiangmen, Shenzhen, Zhaoqing, Zhongshan 
and Zhuhai located there. Despite the fact that these areas are covered with fertile paddy 
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soil, they may expose to other environment problems (e.g. soil erosion and flooding) 
which are detrimental to their economic development. 
To study the impact of geography on growth, different proxies capturing the 
different geographical features of the prefectures are constructed and they will be used in 
our empirical analysis. In particular, our empirical analysis experiments with such 
indicators as the shortest distance from the coast9 and the number of mountainous 
counties 10 that are presented in table 2.1. We focus on the contribution by physical 
landscape but ignore the influence of climatic conditions. 
2.2 Openness 
Guangdong has a long history of involvement in foreign trade. Prior to the 
Opium War, Guangzhou, one of its prefectural cities, already served as the only port for 
handling external trade. However, Guangdong's role as the window of China to the rest 
of the world came to an abrupt end when the communists came to power in 1949 and 
foreign trade was put under central planning. The situation was reversed in 1979 when 
China began her transition to the market economy. With her proximity to Hong Kong, 
the province was one step ahead in adopting the open door policy (Vogel (1989)). Not 
only did the central government establish three special economic zones in Guangdong, it 
has also set up the Pearl River Delta Open Coastal Economic Zone there. During the 
9 To be precise, our first measure of geography is defined as the minimum distance between the location 
of a prefectural government and the coast. 
10 While Guangdong's prefectures vary largely in land area and have the administrative control over 
different number of counties, our second measure of geography should be standardized by dividing the 
land area of mountainous counties over total area of each prefecture. However, due to the limitation in 
gathering the data on the area of mountainous counties, we just select the number of mountainous counties 
as the proxy for geography. 
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1980s, a series of preferential policies were implemented in these regions. Accordingly， 
a huge amount of foreign trade and investment were poured into the Guangdong, 
especially the Pearl River Delta, at that time (See table 2.1). However, due to the rising 
labour wage and gradual spread of Guangdong's preferential policies to the rest of 
China, Guangdong is losing its comparative advantages and facing more competition 
from other provinces. The province may gradually become less attractive to foreign 
investors. 
Because of geographical proximity, Guangdong has established a close 
relationship with Hong Kong. In addition to transferring a large share of exports to Hong 
Kong, Guangdong has absorbed a substantial amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
from the region. In this section, we first look into the foreign exports and FDI in 
Guangdong. Next, the connection between its foreign exports and FDI is explored. 
Guangdong adopts an export-oriented strategy, with exports accounting for 
nearly 80 per cent of its GDP in 1998. Through exporting predominantly labour-
intensive goods to international markets, it earns and accumulates a considerable amount 
of foreign exchange for importing equipment and raw materials. This in turn facilitates 
technological spillover and thereby promotes the development of domestic enterprises in 
Guangdong (Bui et al. (2003)). 
The success of Guangdong in promoting exports may be traced to those policies 
promulgated in the early 1980s. First, enterprises that engaged in export activities were 
permitted to keep 30 per cent of their foreign exchange income at that time. In addition, 
the government of Guangdong increasingly granted export licenses to its enterprises and 
opened more ports for international trade. All these measures may probably simplify the 
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administrative procedure and substantially reduce the cost of exporting goods, thereby 
led to the expansion of exports in Guangdong (Maruya (1992)). 
Guangdong has been the largest recipient of foreign direct investment. Recently, 
there are more than 70,000 foreign enterprises investing in this province, while over 80 
per cent of them are derived from Hong Kong. These corporations play an important role 
in Guangdong, accounting for 50 per cent of industrial production and employing up to 7 
million workers in 2001 (Bui et al. (2003)). 
Foreign enterprises in Guangdong are concentrated in the manufacturing sector, 
producing a majority of light industrial goods such as electronic appliances, textile and 
toys, etc. In general, these enterprises may be divided into two categories. The first kind 
of foreign investment is called sanzi qiye (three types of foreign-invested enterprises), 
which is comprised of wholly foreign-owned enterprise, equity joint venture and 
contractual joint venture. Other form of foreign investment, which is known as sanlai 
yibu (three imported and one compensatory), is involved in export processing and 
compensation trade. Since sanlai yibu is much flexible in the sense that the owner may 
withdraw their investment once the contract is expired, they developed rather rapidly in 
the early 1980s. Nevertheless, foreign investors have shifted towards long-term 
investment since 1990. As a result, investment from sanzi qiye far exceeds that from 
sanlai yibu in Guangdong at present. 
There has been a close linkage between exports and foreign direct investment in 
Guangdong. Most of the foreign businesses operating there are export-oriented, probably 
due to two reasons. First, foreign invested enterprises in Guangdong were prohibited to 
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sell their products in the domestic market during the 1980s. The only way they could 
distribute their outputs was to export to other countries. 
In addition, many enterprises from Hong Kong have relocated their production 
plants to the Pearl River Delta in order to benefit from the abundant supply of cheap 
labour and land resources. The finished products of these enterprises will then be 
transferred back to Hong Kong for domestic consumption or re-exporting to other 
countries. Thus, foreign enterprises in Guangdong keep on exporting their outputs to 
other countries, notwithstanding the opening of domestic market to foreign investors. In 
1990，up to 80.9 per cent of its total exports was brought to Hong Kong, while 74 per 
cent of them came from the Pearl River Delta (Chu and Yeung (1994)). 
Hidden behind the rapid growth of exports and the huge inflow of foreign direct 
investments are the uneven distribution of exports and foreign direct investments among 
the prefectures. The overall configuration is that exports and foreign direct investments 
are mainly channeled into the Pearl River Delta. For example, the prefectures of 
Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Dongguan, all in the Pearl River Delta, accounted for more 
than 60 percent of FDI and 40 percent of exports in 1995 (see Table 2.1). This 
configuration is not accidental since many preferential policies were first granted to the 
prefectures in the Delta, making it a magnet for export-oriented foreign firms (especially 
those from Hong Kong due to proximity). 
For the purpose of the subsequent empirical analysis on the impact of openness 
on growth, the above discussion suggests that a number of proxies for openness may be 
considered. Among them are the export to GDP ratio and foreign direct investment to 
GDP ratio commonly used in the previous literature on the subject (see, e.g., Chen and 
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Fleisher (1996)，Demurger (2001) and Xu and Zou (2000)). Apart from this, it is also 
worth using a dummy for the Pearl River Delta as a proxy for openness. The subsequent 
regression analysis will experiment with the different proxies as right hand side 
variables though the dummy for Pearl River Delta seems to have an advantage of being 
exogenous while other two may suffer from the econometric problem of endogeneity. 
We shall return to this issue and have a more detailed exploration in chapters 4 and 5. 
2.3 Fiscal Decentralization 
Of the many institutional innovations that are often considered critical to China's 
spectacular economic growth in the reform era, many scholars have singled out fiscal 
decentralization (Jin et al. (2001) and Zhang and Zou (1998)). In the pre-reform era, 
central government had absolute control over revenues and issued mandatory fiscal 
targets to the provinces. But because of the large size of China and the heterogeneity of 
local conditions, it is both essential and beneficial to increase their flexibility and 
responsiveness by delegating the authority of fiscal management to them. The reform era 
has ushered in a more decentralized fiscal system that are often considered important to 
local economic growth (Lin and Liu (2000)). In particular, two aspects of fiscal 
decentralization in China in the reform era are worth highlighting. Through adopting 
fiscal contracts between successive tiers of governments, subordinate governments have 
more discretion in their public finances. With their newfound freedom, local 
governments can boost their budgets through promoting such ventures as township and 
village enterprises (TVEs). It turns out that the TVEs became the engine of economic 
growth in the first two decades of economic reform. The rest of this section explains in 
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more detail these two aspects of fiscal decentralization with special emphasis on the 
prefectures of Guangdong. The discussion serves also as a motivation on how proxies 
for fiscal decentralization may be constructed for our subsequent empirical study 
Since 1980, there has been decentralization of fiscal power from central to 
provincial governments". First, provincial government could decide the structure of 
their expenditures within the regulations laid down by the State Council and the Ministry 
of Finance. More importantly, fiscal contracts, which stipulated the division of 
budgetary revenue between the central and provincial governments, were introduced. 
China's provinces in turn determined their fiscal arrangement with sub-provincial 
governments. Fiscal contracts were then enacted between successive tiers of sub-
provincial government. 
Since our analysis focuses on Guangdong's prefectures, the fiscal contracts 
enacted between the provincial and prefectural governments are discussed below. In 
Guangdong, the revenue-sharing contracts are re-negotiated every 3-5 years. There were 
three types of contracts adopted throughout the period 1980-1998，which shared the 
same principle of leaving enough funds for prefectures to cover their approved expenses. 
Among the three revenue sharing schemes, the one implemented in 1980 was the most 
centralized in the sense that provincial government set a targeted revenue and 
expenditure for each prefecture. Since then, more fiscal powers have been granted to the 
prefectural governments. Most prefectures were just obliged to remit a lump sum to the 
provincial government and could retain any remaining revenue after 1985^1 
” S e e Wong (1991) and Wong (1997). 
'2 According to the fiscal contracts adopted in 1994’ some Guangdong's prefectures such as Meizhou even 
received a fixed subsidy from the provincial government (See Guangdong zhengbao 1994(3)). 
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In order to increase the incentive for prefectural government to collect taxes, the 
three types of fiscal contracts commonly stipulated the marginal retention rates for 
incremental revenues above the revenue targets laid down in the contracts (i.e. chaoshou 
fencheng). A higher marginal retention rate implies a greater share of incremental 
revenue that the prefectural governments retained for financing local infrastructure. The 
incentive for a prefectural government to collect revenues may thus increase with the 
marginal retention rate. In the early 1980s, the marginal retention rate varied greatly 
between p r e f e c t u r e s A s presented in table 2.1，Jieyang and Shanwei could retain only 
15 per cent of their incremental revenue, while Shenzhen and Zhuhai enjoyed a marginal 
retention rate up to 100 per cent in 1980. For most prefectures, the marginal retention 
rate ranged from 15 to 100 per cent of the above-target revenues in the first half of the 
1980s, though these prefecture-specific rates increased over time so that all prefectures 
have been allowed to retain their above-target revenues since 1991. In other words, more 
fiscal powers are delegated to the prefectural government over time. 
Fiscal decentralization has also stimulated the growth of township and village 
enterprises (TVEs) in China. TVEs refer to all business units operating in the township 
and village areas which are collectively owned by rural residents " . With the 
decentralization of fiscal powers, prefectural government took the responsibility of 
balancing their own budgets. In order to generate sufficient funds for local development, 
they rapidly developed township and village enterprises in the rural areas (Lin and Liu 
(2000)). 
13 The marginal retention rates are obtained from a large number of annals (See Appendix I). 
14 There was no official definition of TVEs prior to 1997 (Bui et al. (2003)). 
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As stipulated in the regulations, they have to remit parts of their profits to local 
government for financing local infrastructure and other public activities. There has been 
rapid development of township and village enterprises in Guangdong since the reform. 
The number of TVEs increased from 80.9 thousand to 1.41 million between 1978 and 
1999. This in turn generates a substantial amount of revenue for the government. For 
instance, the taxes which TVEs paid contributed to 21.5 per cent of revenue collected by 
the provincial government in 1997, compared to 3.4 per cent in 1978 (Bui et al. (2003)). 
The development of township and village enterprises has helped boost economic 
growth of Guangdong's prefectures (See table 2.1 for TVEs' outputs in each prefecture). 
First, they create employment and transfer excess labour into industrial production. 
While facing harder budget constraints, many have argued that TVEs may operate more 
efficiently compared to the state-owned enterprises (See Jin and Qian (1997) and Che 
and Qian (1998)). 
The above discussion suggests that fiscal decentralization confers on prefecture 
governments more discretion to make better use of their resources to develop their local 
economies in accordance with their local conditions and adopt measures such as the 
promotion of TVEs that may ultimately foster local economic growth. Many China 
experts have thus argued that there is a positive relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and economic growth (Lin and Liu (2000) and Jin et al. (2001)). The 
exploration of such a link is also an important component of this thesis. Though fiscal 
decentralization is a complicated concept, the above discussion suggests a couple of 
proxies for fiscal decentralization to be used to test the link mentioned above. One of 
them is the prefecture-specific marginal retention rate. This proxy, which may affect the 
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tax effort of a prefectural government, has often been used in previous studies to 
measure the degree of fiscal decentralization. Moreover, since fiscal decentralization 
may affect growth through promoting the development of township and village 
enterprises, this study incorporates the share ofTVEs into the model. 
Concluding Remarks 
This chapter scrutinizes three different dimensions of Guangdong ranging from 
geography, openness to fiscal decentralization that are pertinent to economic growth. As 
shown in table 2.1, the above factors, which vary largely across Guangdong's 
prefectures, seem to be highly correlated with their growth performances. For instance, 
with an advantageous geographical location and higher degree of openness and fiscal 
decentralization, Shenzhen has achieved an average annual growth rate which was the 
highest among all Guangdong's prefectures. Such a configuration motivates us to mount 
a more rigorous analysis to examine whether geography, openness and fiscal 
decentralization contribute to the growth of Guangdong's prefectures in subsequent 
chapters. The above discussion suggests a number of proxies for geography, openness 
and fiscal decentralization that may be crucial to our empirical study'^ 
'5 丁hough there is a large number of proxies for measuring geography, openness and fiscal 





While this thesis is a case study of Guangdong's intra-provincial inequalities and 
the factors leading to inter-prefecture differences in economic growth, the main theme of 
this paper is closely related to the many issues tackled by a rapidly growing literature on 
inter-country differences in economic growth. Derived from this growing literature is 
the analytical framework adopted for our empirical analysis in the subsequent chapters. 
It is therefore useful to review this literature as a prelude to our empirical analysis. In 
addition, this chapter also reviews the growing literature on regional disparities in China. 
3.1 Literature on Economic Growth and Interregional Disparities 
Related to our study of regional disparities is a large literature on forces shaping 
cross-country income differences. An important topic of this literature is on the question 
of convergence, i.e., whether incomes per capita of rich and poor countries converge 
over time. Due to diminishing marginal returns to capital, the neo-classical growth 
model predicts that countries with low capital-labour ratio grow faster than their richer 
neighbours. This implies that countries differing only in capital-labour ratio will 
inexorably converge to the same steady states in the long run. To test this prediction of 
the neoclassical growth model, Barro (1991) is a pioneering article regressing growth 
rates on initial level of GDP per capita using data from a cross section of countries. His 
study has set off an explosion of research on the subject. In so far as the regression 
coefficient of initial GDP per capita is negative, Barro refers to this as /^-convergence. 
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Implicit in the above prediction is that countries have the same steady-state 
output per capita. In the real world, it is unlikely that countries have the same steady-
state output per capita. To control for differences in steady-state output per capita, there 
has been a growing literature following the footstep of Barro to test whether there is 
convergence by first controlling for those factors affecting the steady state (e.g., see 
Barro's book for references) . ^^  There is then conditional /^-convergence if the 
coefficient of initial income per capita is both negative and statistically significant after 
controlling for those factors. In the process of investigating conditional /^-convergence, 
it is also possible to identify those factors that may account for inter-country differences 
in output per capita. 
To explain the income differences in the long run, Hall and Jones (1999) propose 
another method by regressing the level of GDP per capita on all possible determinants of 
income. (See also Acemoglu et al. (2001)，Alcala and Ciccone (2002), Easterly and 
Levine (2002) and Rodrik et al. (2002)). Out of the two possible methods, this study 
selects Barro-type growth equation for the empirical investigation. 
Through adopting the Barro-type framework, previous studies include a set of 
standard variables, viz” the investment ratio and share of agricultural sector in the 
equation to identify the factors underlying economic growth. With an increasing number 
of literature exploring such dimensions as geography, openness and institutions that are 
pertinent to growth, some recent studies attempt to investigate the impacts of all three 
factors on growth performances together. Prior to discussing these recent studies, we 
first review the respective literature on geography, openness and institutions. 
16 See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) for a survey of this large literature. 
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Geography may contribute to growth through various channels. As discussed in 
Henderson et al. (2001)，it is one of the key determinants of transportation costs. The 
longer the distance from a destination, the higher are the transportation costs. Since 
production processes often involve the transfer of raw materials and distribution of 
finished products, the gain from an industrial sector is largely affected by topographical 
characteristics. Accordingly, production activities are pulled disproportionately towards 
locations with good market access (See Fujita et al. (1999), Krugman (1991) and 
Venables (1996) for the discussion on agglomeration). However, as that region becomes 
over-crowded, further investment may not yield desirable profits. Some production 
activities may then move away the existing location and start agglomerating in other 
areas, resulting in the formation of new growth centres (Henderson (1999)). It is thus 
conceivable that geography may directly influence the rate of economic growth and 
spatial distribution of income across different regions. 
There is in recent years a growing literature trying to ascertain empirically the 
impact of geography on growth (See e.g. Gallup et al. (1998) and Mellinger et al. 
(2000)). In this literature, the distance from coast is used as one of the proxies for 
geography. From the results of Gallup et al. (1998) and Mellinger et al. (2000), 
geography is strongly correlated with economic growth. Climate zone, which is another 
proxy for geography, is also significantly related with growth performances. 
Openness, which reflects how well an economy is integrated with the world, is 
considered an important factor that may promote economic growth. In theory, there are 
different channels through which openness may affect growth. Through access to the 
international markets, technological spillovers from foreign countries to local economy 
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may be facilitated (See Young (1991) and Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991)). Apart from 
this, globalization may improve the efficiency of domestic enterprises in two ways 
(Feder (1982). It may bring in competition and force domestic enterprises to improve 
their productivity and management skills. Moreover, after the opening up of an economy, 
domestic enterprises are allowed to export their products to foreign countries. Facing the 
increase in aggregate demand for their commodities, domestic firms may then expand 
their production and benefit from the economies of scale. This implies that the greater 
the degree of openness, the faster is the economic growth. 
There has been a growing empirical literature on openness and growth. Dollar 
(1992)，Fischer (1993) and Levine and Renelt (1992) directly measure the degree of 
openness by the imports or exports to GDP ratio. Frankel and Romer (1999) argue that 
the actual trade share may be endogenous in the model and hence is not a good proxy for 
openness. To address the problem, they estimate a gravity model by regressing the share 
of bilateral trade on various geographical factors, such as the land area, distance, 
population and dummy for landlocked countries. A predicted trade share obtaining from 
the gravity model is then selected for the empirical investigation. All these studies 
suggest that there is a positive relationship between trade and growth. 
Other than geography and openness, economists have increasingly focused their 
attention on the role of institutions on growth. Institutions, which are enforced to 
maintain the order of a society, play a crucial role in the real world. With asymmetric 
information among different parties, transaction costs are non-negligible and thus 
exchange of goods and services may be hindered. As discussed in North (1991), this 
problem may partially be tackled in the presence of formal and informal constraints. By 
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reducing the uncertainty faced by individuals, institutions may lower the transaction 
costs and facilitate exchange of commodities. Therefore, institutions and institutional 
innovation may shape incentives on domestic investments, thereby affecting the 
economic performances. For instance, fiscal decentralization may be an important 
institutional innovation affecting growth. According to the traditional theory of 
federalism, governments at lower levels have better information about local tastes and 
thereby may allocate resources more efficiently (Gates (1993) and Weingast (1995)). It 
is thus conceivable that the higher the degree of fiscal decentralization, the faster is the 
economic growth. 
The present study focuses on the impact of fiscal decentralization as an 
institutional innovation on growth. To examine the effect of fiscal decentralization on 
growth, Davoodi and Zou (1998) and Davoodi et al. (1999) use the sub-national share of 
total government spending as a proxy for fiscal decentralization. Contrary to the theory 
of federalism, they obtain a negative relationship between fiscal decentralization and 
growth. However, Lin and Liu (2000) argue that the above proxy may not reflect the 
fiscal powers accurately as it also depends on the population and size of a region. In the 
context of China, Lin and Liu (2000) measure fiscal decentralization by the marginal 
retention rate that is likely to influence the tax effort of provincial government. Their 
empirical results indicate that fiscal decentralization is conducive to China's economic 
growth. 
There is a growing literature on the relative contribution of geography, openness 
and institutions to economic performance together (See, e.g., Alcala and Ciccone (2002), 
Easterly and Levine (2002) and Rodrik et al. (2002)). Since both openness and 
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institutions may be endogenously determined in the model, these studies employ either 
two-stage least square or generalized method of moments estimation. More specifically, 
the trade share constructed by Frankel and Romer (1999) and settler mortality rates from 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) are chosen as the instruments for openness and institutions 
respectively. These studies unanimously conclude that geography does not affect income 
per capita after controlling for institutions. Easterly and Levine (2002) and Rodrik et al. 
(2002)) suggest that openness is not significantly related to the economic performance, 
while Alcala and Ciccone (2002) arrive at opposite results. The debate is not settled and 
this is still an area attracting much attention in recent years. 
3.2 Literature on Inter-regional Disparities in China 
With the above literature as a background, we look into the study of regional 
disparities within the context of China. In recent years, rising inequality in China has 
caught the attention of scholars and policymakers alike. There are two issues extensively 
addressed in previous studies: (1) the trend of inter-regional disparities; and (2) factors 
explaining the income gap across China's province. Notwithstanding a large body of 
literature exploring the trend of inter-regional disparities^^ they employ different data 
and produce contrasting results (Cai et al (2002)，Chen and Fleisher (1996), Lyons 
(1991)，Tsui (1991) and Tsui (1996)). For instance, Tsui (1996) suggests that inter-
provincial inequality declined in the first half of the 1980s but exhibited an mildly 
These studies examine the trend of inter-regional disparities using various inequality measures such as 
the log of variance, coefficient of variation, generalized entropy measure, Atkinson Index and Gini 
coefficient. The definitions and properties of each inequality measure are briefly discussed in chapter four. 
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upward trend during the subsequent period, while Cai et al. (2002) argues for a 
downward trend of inter-provincial disparity up to 1990. 
Similar to the cross-country studies mentioned above, conditional /^-convergence 
is widely investigated among the literature on China's regional inequalities. Through 
estimating the Barro's growth equation, Cai et al. (2002), Chen and Fleisher (1996), 
Demurger (2001) and Hsueh (1994) obtain similar evidence showing conditional 
convergence in China. Yao and Zhang (2001) apply the same method, except that the 
provinces are classified into eastern, central and western region. Their empirical results, 
however, indicate that there is convergence only among the provinces in each region, 
thereby China's provinces diverge into different clubs over time. 
In addition, the impacts of geography, openness and fiscal decentralization on 
growth are separately explored in the existing literature. Other than transportation costs 
and volume of trade, Demurger et al. (2002) contend that topographical characteristics 
may also affect the agricultural productivity in China'^ Since the agricultural sector is 
especially large in China, differences in agricultural productivity may help shape inter-
provincial disparities. Through performing an empirical analysis, Brun et al. (2002), 
Demurger (2001) and Demurger et al. (2002) all suggest that geographical location 
significantly accounts for the growth performances of China's provinces. 
With respect to openness, globalization is perceived to be a force driving 
economic growth in China. After the implementation of the Open Door Policy in 1978， 
China has attracted a substantial amount of foreign trade and FDL As expected, 
18 The composition and fertility of soil vary substantially across different regions in China. Since these 
elements are essential to the farming activities, the productivity of agricultural sector may be influenced 
by the geographic location. 
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Bethelemy and Demurger (2000) and Chen and Feng (2000) find a positive relationship 
between FDI and growth. These studies suggest that FDI may bring in competition and 
force domestic firms to improve their productivity and management. Despite Yao and 
Zhang (2001) and Zhang and Zou (1998) measure openness by the foreign trade to GDP 
ratio, their empirical findings still indicate that openness is conducive to economic 
growth. 
As pointed out above, an important dimension of China's institutional innovation 
pertains to fiscal decentralization. The effect of fiscal decentralization in China may 
somehow be different from that in other parts of the world. Since taxes were collected 
by sub-national governments and remitted to upper levels based on a pre-specified 
sharing rate before 1994, the incentives for sub-national governments to collect revenue 
might rise with fiscal decentralization (Jin et al. (2001)). Those prefectural governments 
with greater tax efforts may retain sufficient funds for financing their capital 
construction. Thus, fiscal decentralization may lead to more sustainable economic 
growth through stimulating investment in addition to improving economic efficiency 
(Lin and Liu (2000)). 
However, there may be some disadvantages of fiscal decentralization. First, 
predatory local governments with budgetary shortfalls may levy excessive fees on local 
enterprises, thus hurting the investment environment and hindering economic growth 
(Wong (1997)). Furthermore, due to the close relationship between local state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and local governments, governments may keep on financing those 
SOEs which face soft budget constraints. Unless local governments focus on developing 
the non-state sector, fiscal decentralization may not enhance the efficiency of resources 
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allocation (Qian and Roland (1998)). The effect of fiscal decentralization on growth in 
China is thus ambiguous. Zhang and Zou (1998) demonstrate a negative relationship 
between fiscal decentralization and growth, while Lin and Liu (2000) and Jin et al. 
(2001) come up with an opposite conclusion. 
Concluding Remarks 
This study intends to adopt an analytical framework similar to that of previous 
studies and extends their works from the provincial to prefectural level. Out of the two 
estimation methods discussed above, the growth equation proposed by Barro (1991) is 
chosen for this study. Estimating this equation allows us to examine both conditional p-
convergence and forces shaping intra-provincial disparities in Guangdong. By 
incorporating the proxies for geography, openness and fiscal decentralization into the 
growth equation, this study evaluates how the three factors affect growth performances 




As discussed in the introduction, there are two issues to be explored in this study. 
We first examine the trend of intra-provincial inequalities in Guangdong. Then, this 
study looks into the forces driving differential economic growth at the prefecture level, 
ultimately shaping regional disparities. With these two questions in mind, the framework 
proposed by Barro (1991) is adopted. We first discuss two concepts of convergence that 
are relevant to the study of regional disparities, cj-convergence is investigated using two 
inequality measures, while ^^convergence is directly derived from the above framework 
to look into the trend of regional disparities. Furthermore, to examine the respective 
contributions of geography, openness and fiscal decentralization to growth, this study 
invokes the growth equation introduced by Barro (1991). 
4.1 Two concepts of convergence 
Do income differences between regions increase or decrease? Two concepts may 
be invoked to answer this question. One of them is cr-convergence that measures the 
cross-section dispersion of income per capita over time often with the help of an 
inequality index. A decrease in income dispersion reflects that there is cr-convergence 
among different countries, /^-convergence measures the partial relationship between 
initial GDP per capita and growth by estimating a growth equation to be explained later. 
As pointed out in the last chapter, the neo-classical model predicts countries with low 
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capital-labour ratio to grow faster. It follows that the coefficient of initial income per 
capita should be negative and statistically significant. 
According to Quah (1993), y^convergence is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for a - c o n v e r g e n c e I n other words, /^"convergence may not necessarily 
imply cr-convergence among different countries. To examine the two concepts of 
convergence, various tests are introduced below. 
4.1.1 Test for o=-Convergence 
Measuring the cross-section dispersion of income per capita over time may allow 
us to explore the trend of regional disparities across different countries. There are 
several inequality measures adopted by previous studies to examine cr-convergence. 
They include the log of variance, coefficient of variation, Theil's entropy measure, 
Atkinson index and Gini coefficient, etc. Among all inequality measures, the log of 
variance is perhaps the simplest to compute. But the major weakness is that it does not 
satisfy the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle . Measures such as the coefficient of 
variation, Atkinson index, Gini coefficient and Theil's entropy measure do not suffer 
from this problem. In this study, the trend of Guangdong's intra-provincial disparities is 
evaluated using the coefficient of variation and Theil's entropy measure. It is useful to 
employ more than one index because the trend may be sensitive to the index used. The 
definitions of these two inequality measures are given below. 
19 Even if the countries are approaching the same steady states over time, a shock can transitorily 
exaggerate the regional disparities among them. 
20 The Pigou-Dalton transfer principle predicts inequality to fall when one dollar is transferred from a rich 
to poor region (Cowell and Victoria-Feser (1996)). 
28 
The coefficient of variation is widely used in the existing literature to measure 
the trend of inter-regional disparities (See e.g. Tsui (1991) and Lyons (1991)). The 
coefficient of variation and its population-weighted version are as follows: 
C K 二 ” '.=1 乂 ~ "‘.=丨 j (1) 
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where n is the number of prefectures, while 7/ and P,- denote the GDP per capita and the 
population of the prefecture respectively. The higher the coefficient of variation, the 
greater is the dispersion of income among different regions. 
Another index is Theil's entropy measure. The population-weighted version of 
Theil's entropy measure is employed in this study (See, e.g., Tsui and Wang (2002)): 
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ygi = Ygi / Pgi. Ygi and Pgi denote the GDP and population of the i出 prefecture in the g出 
region, y = 0/,...,少 g) where yg = 0^/,..., ygNg). G is the number of regions (i.e. 2 in the 
present context) and Ng is the number of prefectures in the gth region. 
One reason for using Theil's entropy measure is that we intend to look into the 
income gap between the Pearl River Delta and other areas in Guangdong, this study 
classifies twenty-one prefectures into two groups. Theil's measure is decomposable in 
the sense that overall regional disparity may be decomposed into intra-regional (WG) 
and inter-regional (BG) disparity: 
I(y) = fVG(y) + BG(y) (5) 
Intra-regional inequality assumes the following form: 
G t P . 
= ， (6) 
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WG only captures inequalities within each region while ignoring inequalities between 
regions. The opposite is true with respect to the inter-regional inequality: 
G f . ^ 
二 ， (7) 
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4.1.2 Test for /^-convergence 
This concept of convergence is derived from the neoclassical growth model. 
Altogether, there are two types of /^-convergence. Unconditional /^-convergence predicts 
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a negative relationship between initial GDP per capita and output per capita growth, 
while conditional /^-convergence suggests a similar relationship after controlling for the 
steady states. To better understand the idea of /^-convergence, this study first introduces 
a framework that is based on the neo-classical model. Then we discuss the tests for 
investigating unconditional and conditional /^-convergence in Guangdong. 
Behind the neoclassical growth model is the assumption of diminishing marginal 
returns to capital. The implication is that poor countries, with lower capital-labour ratio 
and higher marginal returns, will grow faster than the rich. They will gradually catch up 
with their rich neighbours and hence all countries will converge to the same steady states 
in the long run. Based on this idea, Barro (1991) proposes the following growth 
equation: 
where g is the growth rate of per capita output. 7 reflects the current level of per capita 
output, while / denotes the level of per capita output at the steady s t a t e]!，不 is the 
kth determinant of the steady-state output per capita. Examples of Xk are the saving rate, 
openness and government policies. (See Barro (1997) for the list of these variables). 
Due to diminishing returns to capital, growth rate (g) is assumed to be negatively 
related with Y, holding the steady state {¥*) constant. This implies that poor countries 
tend to grow faster than rich countries if there is no difference in 7*. On the other hand, 
output per capita growth rate is positively related with Y*, holding Y constant. This 
21 For the model with labour-augmented technology, Y* should represent the level of output per effective 
worker at the steady state. 
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steady state value (7*) may in turn be determined by various factors (Xa：). For example, 
with such an institutional innovation as the fiscal decentralization, growth may 
accelerate and hence output per capita may increase. Again, because of diminishing 
returns, the growth rate will decline until it converges to a pre-determined value^^. 
Hence, output per capita will approach a steady state that exceeds its original level in the 
long run (See Barro(1997)). 
To conclude, growth rate is affected by both the initial GDP per capita and 
steady-state output per capita level. More specifically, the farther the steady state is 
away from initial GDP per capita, the faster the growth rate of an economy. This implies 
that the growth equation should include the initial GDP per capita as well as all 
determinants of steady-state equilibrium. If the coefficient of initial GDP per capita is 
both negative and statistically significant, then there is conditional y0-convergence. In 
order to examine conditional convergence among Guangdong's prefectures, this study 
estimates equation (8) using a panel of prefectural data. The reasons and techniques of 
using panel data will be discussed in the next chapter. 
In the special case when steady states are the same across different regions, the 
differences in their growth performances will solely be explained by the initial GDP per 
capita. Then the corresponding growth equation may be simplified as: 
g = Fi^Y)= (9) 
22 The growth rate of output per capita, g, converges to the rate of technological progress for the model 
with labour-augmented technology and zero otherwise. 
32 
There is the evidence of unconditional /^-convergence if the initial GDP per capita is 
negatively and significantly related with growth rate in equation (9). To test 
unconditional y^convergence, the above equation is estimated using cross-section data. 
More precisely, the dependent variable is the average annual growth rate of real GDP 
per capita over a time period, while the independent variable is the real GDP per capita 
in the starting year of the period. 
In fact, unconditional /^-convergence is just a special case of conditional 
convergence. Two types of /^convergence will coincide given the same Y* for different 
countries. The reason is that the determinants�X“, if equivalent across different 
countries, will not result in the differences in current growth performances. 
4.2 Growth Equation 
As a prelude to studying y^convergence and the factors underlying intra-
provincial disparities in Guangdong, we set up a Barro-type growth equation with 
respect to the prefectures. Included in the growth equation is a set of right-hand-side 
variables that account for differences in steady-state output per capita among 
Guangdong's prefectures. In particular, the analysis focuses on three sets of factors 
relating to geography, openness and fiscal decentralization that may contribute to the 
growth of Guangdong's prefectures. Various proxies for geography, openness and fiscal 
decentralization for the empirical investigation together with the exact specification of 
the growth equation are introduced. 
Following the standard literature on unconditional y0-convergence, the growth 
equation is specified as follows: 
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， / e [ 0 , « ] a n d te[0,T] (10) 
where i, t and k denotes the i出 prefecture,产 time period and k^ determinant of steady 
states, while n, T, K are the number of prefectures, time periods and determinants 
respectively, g represents the growth rate of real GDP per capita and Y is the real GDP 
per capita. To test for conditional convergence, ln(T,心)instead of the initial GDP per 
capita is used in the panel estimation (See Appendix II or Islam (1995) for detailed 
explanation), a is the individual effect of each prefecture and f is a random disturbance 
term. The detailed definitions and sources of data for the regression exercises are 
provided in the Appendix I. Xkt consists of a set of variables which control for the 
steady-state output per capita level. The variables to be included in Xkt may vary among 
different regression models. Other than such variables as investment to GDP ratio, the 
set oi Xkt includes proxies for geography, openness and fiscal decentralization. The rest 
of this section explains how these proxies are constructed. 
Various proxies have been used in previous studies to capture different 
dimensions of geography. Demurger et al. (2002) employ various indicators such as the 
average slope of a province, percentage of area with the slope exceeds 10 per cent and 
distance from coast to capture the differences in physical landscape. Following their 
study, two measures including the shortest distance from coast {DIST) and a dummy for 
mountainous regions {MOUNT) are introduced in our growth equation for examining the 
contribution by geography. Though the first measure is commonly adopted by existing 
literature (See, for example, Demurger (2001) and Xu and Zou (2000))，this study 
conjectures that the dummy for mountainous region is a better proxy. It is because the 
high altitude of mountainous region with its rugged terrain and poor soil may largely 
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impede economic performance through raising transportation cost and lowering 
agricultural productivity. 
Included among Xkt is a measure of the degree of openness. Different proxies 
have been suggested. Numerous studies directly use the foreign investment ratio or trade 
share23 (See, for example, Brun et al. (2002)，Chen and Fleisher (1996), Demurger 
(2001), Xu and Zou (2000)，Yao and Zhang (2001) and Zhang and Zou (1998)). Frankel 
and Romer (1999) suggest that actual trade share may be endogenous and address the 
problem by estimating a gravity model. To be precise, they regress the share of bilateral 
trade on various geographical factors, such as the land area, distance, population and 
dummy for landlocked countries, and obtain a predicted trade share for the empirical 
investigation. However, as panel data is employed in this study, the above method, 
which is designed for cross-section estimation, is not applicable here. Instead of using 
the trade volume, Demurger et al. (2002) construct a preferential policy index to reflect 
the degree of openness. They assign each province a weight, which ranges from zero to 
three, according to the type of economic zone it hosts. 
In light of the previous studies and data limitations with respect to Guangdong's 
prefectures, different proxies for openness are conceivable. One of them is a dummy for 
Pearl River Delta {DELTA) as a proxy of preferential policies in the equation. 
Specifically, 
1， if the prefecture is located in the Pearl River Delta, 
y-v r^ T rn A 厂 
DELTA = < 
0， otherwise 
23 The trade share may be the exports to GDP ratio or the share of sum of imports and exports in total 
GDP. 
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In addition, foreign investment ratio and export to GDP ratio are also used. As pointed 
out by Frankel and Romer (1999)，these two variables may be endogenous and estimates 
based on them may be biased. In so far as DELTA captures the region-based preferential 
policies that increase openness, it is more likely to be exogenous and may thus avoid the 
problem of endogeneity. 
Next, a set of measures related to fiscal decentralization is introduced. Compared 
with geography and openness, fiscal decentralization as an institutional innovation in 
China is rarely explored in the existing literature. Zhang and Zou (1998) measure the 
degree of fiscal decentralization by the ratio of provincial government expenditure to 
total central government expenditure. Lin and Liu (2000) argue that the government 
spending ratio may not reflect fiscal power accurately since it also depends on the 
population and size of a province. They select a marginal retention rate, which is likely 
to influence the tax effort and consumption behavior of provincial government, as a 
proxy for fiscal decentralization. Similar to Lin and Liu (2000)，this study measures the 
degree of fiscal decentralization by the marginal retention rate of prefectural government 
in Guangdong. Furthermore, as discussed in chapter two, fiscal decentralization may 
exert positive impact on economic growth through stimulating the development of 
township and village enterprises. In order to estimate the above effect, this study adds 
the share ofTVEs to the growth equation. 
Fiscal decentralization may thus be measured by the marginal retention rate (MR) 
and the TVE employment ratio {TVE). To derive the marginal retention rate of each 
prefecture, this study has carefully gone through a large number of annals such as the 
Chaozhou shizhi, Foshan shizhi, Guangzhou shizhi, Zhuhai shizhi, Guangdong fagui 
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guizhang huibian 1984-86, 1987-88 and 1989-90, Guangdong zhengbao 1994(3) and 
many other publications^"^. 
Other than proxies for geography, openness and fiscal decentralization, there is 
an additional set of right hand side variables. Some of them are standard in Barro's 
regression equation. They are the investment to GDP ratio (J) and primary to GDP ratio 
(PRIM) (See, e.g., Demurger (2001)). First, the investment to GDP ratio may be 
regarded as the saving rate. According to the neo-classical model, higher saving rate 
raises steady-state output per effective worker. As explained in section 4.1.2，the 
corresponding rate of growth will then speed up such that the economy may converge to 
the new steady state equilibrium in the long run. Thus, the investment to GDP ratio is 
perceived to affect growth positively. 
On the contrary, an increase in the share of primary sector may result in a slower 
output growth rate25. Compared to other countries, primary industry is rather prominent 
in this province. For instance, in 1990，primary output still accounted for 26.1 per cent of 
total GDP in Guangdong (Chu and Yeung (1994)). While the primary sector is 
characterized by its low productivity, the growth performances of Guangdong's 
prefectures may be adversely affected by the development of primary sector. 
Finally, Deng's tour may also promote the growth of Guangdong's prefectures. 
In January 1992, Deng visited Guangdong and encouraged its local officials to step up 
24 See Appendix I for the whole list of annals involved. As mentioned in chapter two, there were three 
types of fiscal contracts adopted by Guangdong's prefectures in the year 1980’ 1981-1984 and 1985-1998 
respectively. Since marginal retention rate remained fixed after the fiscal contract was renegotiated, there 
were altogether three different marginal retention rates for each Guangdong's prefectures during the 
period 1980-1998. 
This implies that productivity will decline if more resources are shifted to the primary sector. It is thus 
conceivable to include the rate of change of primary sector in the growth regression model to measure its 
effect. 
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reform so as to catch up with the Four Little Dragons in East Asia. Responding to his 
call, further reforms were implemented in Guangdong (Chu and Yeung (1994)). To 
control for the Deng's tour, a dummy is introduced in the growth equation: 
fl, if t = 1992-1998, 
D = \ 
0, otherwise 
Concluding Remarks 
In this section, we have introduced various tools (i.e. cr-convergence and (5-
convergence) to explore the pattern of intra-provincial inequalities in Guangdong. In 
order to sort out the factors affecting the growth performances of Guangdong's 
prefectures, a Barro-type growth equation is proposed in section 4.2 for the subsequent 
empirical investigation. Moreover, with our special focus on the geography, openness 




This chapter discusses the issues pertaining to the estimation of the Barro-type 
growth equation. Cross-section as well as panel data were used in previous studies to 
estimate the equation. In this study, panel data for 21 prefectures for the period 1980-
1998 (see Appendix I) are put together for the estimation of the growth equation (i.e., 
equation (10)) introduced in section 4.2. There are certain issues such as the choice 
between fixed-effects as opposed to random-effects model specific to panel-data 
estimation that have to be dealt with in the empirical analysis. One purpose of this 
chapter is to clarify some of these issues critical to our subsequent empirical analysis. 
Other than panel-data estimation, there is a whole host of econometric problems that 
have to be tackled. For example, there is the issue of spurious regression as far as time 
series data are concerned and newly developed tests for unit roots and cointegration for 
panel data have to be invoked to deal with the problem. Other standard econometric 
problems ranging from heterogeneity to bias due to endogeneity of right-hand-side 
variables also have to be taken into account. How these problems are tackled will be 
discussed below. 
5.1 Panel Data Estimation 
Barro-type growth equations were initially estimated using cross-section data 
(e.g. Jian et al. (1996)). But as time series data of countries or regions are getting longer 
and longer, estimation based on panel data has increasingly become more popular (see, 
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e.g., Demurger (2001) and Weeks and Yao (2003)). There are many advantages of using 
panel data^^. First, it increases the degrees of freedom, thus rendering the estimators 
more efficient. Furthermore, with the variables less likely to be highly correlated across 
heterogeneous units, the problem of multicollinearity may be alleviated with the pooling 
of data. Last but not the least, it allows us to investigate the topics that require both 
cross-section and time-series data. In the present context of estimating the Barro-type 
growth equation, if each region in a cross section of data has a region-specific effect that 
is correlated with some right-hand-side variables, then estimates based on ordinary least 
square regression may be biased. However, if time series data are available, various 
methods may be used to deal with this problem. Keeping this in mind, the rest of this 
section will discuss estimation issues specific to panel data estimation. In particular, 
three models, viz., simple pooling, fixed-effects model and random-effects model, are 
introduced and the techniques used to select these models are explained in this section. 
Recalling the model proposed in section 4.2, our growth equation is represented 
by: 
g,., In y；.’卜i+i A , 々 ^ 力 ， Z e [ 0 ， … a n d t e [ O J ] (11) 
/t=i 
where i denotes the prefecture, while t and k denote the t^ '' period and k^ determinant. 
The first question encountered by panel-data estimation is whether the data for different 
units or prefectures should be pooled. However, in the present context, the data are 
pooled in our regression models because the time series are short. In general, there are 
three ways to pool the data^^: 
26 See Hsiao (1986). 
27 See Hsiao (1986). 
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1. In a simple pooling model, both the intercepts (a,) and slopes (p.，/?/,；，Pi,2，…，Pi,id 
are assumed to be the same for all prefectures and remain unchanged over time, i.e., 
«/= A and ( ， A / , A2，...，M = Pi. P2, PK) 
where a , fh，Ih”..’ f k are constants. 
2. A fixed-effects model assumes heterogeneous intercepts but the same slopes across 
prefectures. To be specific, the intercepts stay constant over time (i.e. independent of 
t), though vary across different prefectures, i.e., 
cc产 Mi and (/?；, P i j , pi,2，…，M = f k ) 
where m,. is a constant for the 产 prefecture. The fixed-effects model is essentially 
ordinary least square regression with dummies representing different prefecture-
specific effects in the present context. 
3. The random-effects model, in contrast to the fixed-effects model, assumes the 
individual effects (i.e. the intercepts) to be random, i.e., 
a,= nii + ui and ( , Pu, A:，...，M 二（y^�A,历，...， 
where m,- is a constant for the i出 prefecture and ui �N(0，Qu^) is a random disturbance 
term. Since the variance-covariance matrix a, = m,- + w/, is no longer a diagonal 
matrix, generalized least square estimation has to be used if the estimation is to be 
efficient. 
Since adopting an inappropriate panel data model may result in biased estimators, it is 
important that the "best" model should be selected. In this connection, the analysis-of-
covariance method (Hsiao (1986)) for model selection adopted by our subsequent 
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empirical analysis is explained below. As shown in Figure 5.1, the test involves two 
steps. The first step involves testing the model of simple pooling against the fixed-
effects model. The restricted model is the simple pooling model, while the unrestricted 
model is the fixed-effects model. The null hypothesis is that «/= a. and an F-test maybe 
invoked to determine whether the intercepts are homogeneous across different 
prefectures. If the null hypothesis of homogeneous intercepts is not rejected, then a 
simple pooling model is selected for the regression. Otherwise, the fixed-effects model 
is selected. 
The second step of the model selection procedure is to pit the fixed-effects model 
against the random effects model. If the random-effects model is the correct 
specification, then the estimator based on the fixed-effects model is not efficient. 
However, if the random effect mi is correlated with the right-hand-side variables, then 
the estimator based on the random-effects model is biased. The null hypothesis is that 
the random-effects model is the correct specification. In this case, the vector of estimates 
p旺 based on the random-effect model is very close to PFE based on the fixed-effects 
model so that PFE - PRE is very close to zero. Making use of these observations, the 
Hausman test for the selection of the fixed-effects as opposed to random-effects model is 
a chi-squared test based on PFE - PRE. 
The empirical analysis below experiments with a set of regressions based on the 
growth equation with different right-hand-side variables. For each of these regressions, 
the three models above are estimated and the model selection procedure detailed above 
will be invoked. 
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5.2 Other Econometric Issues 
There are other problems involved in the regression exercises. They include: 
(1) spurious regression; (2) heteroscedasticity; (3) serial correlation; (4) endogeneity and 
(5) misspecification of the model and (6) normality. The following discussion explains 
the strategy for addressing each of the above issues (See, e.g., Greene (2000)). 
First, spurious regression may arise if two non-stationary time series are used in 
a regression model. Even if they are completely unrelated with each other, the empirical 
results may indicate a significant relationship between them. Even though the R-squared 
and t-statistics appear to be satisfactory, the results from this regression are neither 
reliable nor meaningful. 
As many macroeconomic time series are non-stationary processes, it is necessary 
to examine whether the variables contain a unit root prior to estimating the growth 
equation introduced in section 4.2. To test for stationarity of each variable, this study 
performs a panel unit root test proposed by Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) (i.e. IPS test). 
In this test, a standardized t-bar statistics is computed by averaging the ADF statistics of 
different individual series^l The null hypothesis of the IPS test assumes all individual 
series to contain a unit root, while the alternative hypothesis specifies that there is at 
least one of them stationary. 
If the results indicate that both dependent and independent variables are 
integrated with the same order, we should perform the cointegration test using the 
Engle-Granger procedure. Unless these variables are cointegrated, all non-stationary 
28 The lag lengths of the ADF test may vary across different individual series. 
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series will be transformed into to a stationary one by first differencing. Otherwise, level 
data should be employed to estimate the long run relationship between them. 
Ignoring heteroscedasticity may result in inefficient OLS estimators. To take 
account of this phenomenon, the Lagrangian multiplier test will be conducted 
throughout the study. If the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is rejected, then the 
variance-covariance matrix should be adjusted by the White procedure. 
Next, there may be the problem of serial correlation since time-series data are 
involved in the regression exercises. Again, this renders the estimators inefficient. To 
29 • 
test whether this problem exists in our model, the Durbin-Watson test is used . If serial 
correlation cannot be rejected at 5 per cent, our model will be re-estimated assuming 
AR(1) eiTor30 
Some of the variables (?Q’ such as investment ratio, openness and fiscal 
decentralization, may be endogenous in the model and thereby the coefficients of these 
variables may be inconsistent. To detect the problem of endogeneity, this study employs 
the Hausman specification test. More specifically, the null hypothesis of the test 
suggests that ordinary least square estimators are consistent and equivalent to IV 
(instrumental variables) estimators^'. If the null hypothesis is not rejected, then the 
regression is not subject to the problem of endogeneity and hence may be estimated 
using ordinary least square method (OLS). Otherwise, the model should be re-estimated 
using two-stage least square method (2SLS). 
29 See Greene (2000). 
30 = + Ui ’ where w,is a white noise. 
31 The IV estimators are obtained from two steps. First, we regress an endogenous variables (X,) on its lags 
(see e.g. Brun et al. (2002)) and all exogenous variables in the growth equation. The next step is to save 
residuals from the regression and derive the predicted values ofX, for estimation. 
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The misspecification of the model may give rise to biased estimator. To get rid of 
any possible biases, it is necessary to test the functional form of our model. The Ramsey 
Reset test is carried out so as to determine whether some powers of the variables are 
omitted from the equation. If the null hypothesis of no omitted powers is rejected at 5 
per cent, variables of higher order may have to be included in the model. Furthermore, 
this study accounts for the non-linearity of our variables by considering if they enter into 
the equation in the form of log. 
Finally, residuals are often assumed to be normally distributed in the regression 
models. Without such assumption, the respective distributions of t, F and x^ statistics 
will depend on the data instead of following t，F and chi-squared. This implies that the 
ordinary set of critical values may no longer be suitable for the hypothesis testing�?. In 
order to find out if the above assumption holds, the Jarque-Bera test, which specifies that 
disturbances are normally distributed in the null hypothesis, is carried out. 
Concluding Remarks 
Based on the strategy discussed above, the next chapter picks the "best" model 
among the four regression models. To be precise, we start with the tests for the 
stationarity of variables and then select the appropriate panel data model. Next, other 
estimation issues including (1) heteroscedasticity; (2) serial correlation; (3) endogeneity; 
(4) misspecification of the model and (5) normality are addressed. If any of these 
problems is detected in our model, remedial measures are taken. Since the model is 
32 In the special case when sample size is sufficiently large, the ordinary t, F and i statistics will be valid 
for testing the hypotheses (See Greene (2000) for the proof.). 
45 
altered after the adjustments, it is necessary to repeat the model selection procedures 




According to the methods described in chapter four, this study first investigates 
whether there is cr-convergence across Guangdong's prefectures during the period 1980-
2001. Next, unconditional /^-convergence is explored through regressing growth rate on 
the initial GDP per capita. More importantly, the growth equation depicted in section 4.2 
is estimated for examining both conditional /^-convergence and identifying the forces 
behind intra-provincial disparities in Guangdong. Finally, the major findings are 
summarized and explained at the end of this chapter. 
6.1 cpconvergence 
This study measures the income dispersion among twenty-one prefectures in 
Guangdong during the period 1980-2001. Not only do we examine cr-convergence 
within the whole province, cr-convergence among the prefectures located in the Pearl 
River Delta and non-delta regions are investigated separately in this study. 
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 report the results of the coefficient of variation and the 
population-weighted coefficient of variation respectively ^^. According to the two 
figures, the corresponding trends of intra-provincial disparities oscillate upward in 
Guangdong. Both measures approximately increase from 0.5 to 0.8 between 1980 and 
“ U s i n g the output-weighted version of coefficient of variation produce similar results. 
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2001. These findings reveal that there is no cr-convergence across the Guangdong's 
prefectures. 
On the contrary, CV and CVw for the delta and non-delta region remain nearly 
unchanged throughout the period]^. To be precise, the CVw for the delta in 1980 and 
2001 are 0.220 and 0.297 respectively, while the CVw for the non-delta are 0.408 and 
0.413 for the two corresponding periods. This implies neither the income gap among 
prefectures located in the delta nor that among other prefectures are widening over time. 
To interpret these findings, one may conjecture the upward trend of intra-provincial 
disparity to be induced by an increase in income dispersion between the delta and non-
delta regions. 
To further support our conjecture, table 6.1 reports the results of the 
decomposition using Theil's entropy measure. The trend with respect to total, inter-
regional (BG) and intra-regional inequalities (WG) during the period 1980-2001 are 
reported in Figure 6.3. According to the figures reported in table 6.1, Theil's entropy 
measure increases from 0.12 to 0.42 between 1980 and 2001. Consistent with the 
coefficient of variation, this inequality measure indicates that total income gap in 
Guangdong has been widening over time. 
Moreover, the intra-regional disparity is persistently less than the inter-regional 
disparity. As presented in the table 6.1，the inter-regional inequality increases from 0.08 
to 0.31，while the intra-regional inequality rises slightly from 0.04 to 0.11 throughout the 
period. More specifically, the percentage of inter-regional disparities in total disparities 
The pattern is similar when Guangdong's prefectures are partitioned into mountainous and non-
mountainous regions. 
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exceeds 60 per cent at all times. These findings confirm that the income gap between 
delta and non-delta regions accounts substantially for the glaring intra-provincial 
disparities in Guangdong. 
6.2 Unconditional )0-Convergence 
As mentioned in chapter four, cross-section data is employed to explore 
unconditional /^convergence in Guangdong. To be precise, this study examines the 
relationship between average growth rate and initial output per capita (/?„。）for the period 
1980-2001, 1980-1991 and 1992-2001 separately. Let us use the first regression model 
as an example. The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate of real GDP 
per capita from 1980 to 2001, while initial output per capita is reflected by the real GDP 
per capita in 1980. Through performing these regressions, we may detect whether there 
are any changes in the pattern of unconditional y^-convergence after the Deng's tour to 
the south in 1992.^ ^ 
Table 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 report the estimation results. All three regressions produce 
similar results in which the coefficients of initial income per capita are positive and 
statistically significant. In other words, there is no unconditional y^convergence among 
the Guangdong's prefectures. Consistent with the results of cj-convergence, prefectures 
with higher initial GDP per capita experience faster economic growth and diverge away 
from their poorer neighbours. The rate of divergence among prefectures is slightly 
35Local officials especially those in the Special Economic Zones, Pearl River Delta and areas adjacent to 
the delta were told to step up the reforms and encourage further investment from the international markets. 
See Hook (1996). 
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reduced after the Deng's Tour. According to table 6.3 and 6.4，the coefficient of initial 
GDP per capita declines from 1.756 to 1.491 after 1992. 
6.3 Estimation of the Growth Equation and Conditional /^-Convergence 
As pointed out before, unconditional /^-convergence assumed that all prefectures 
have the same steady-state output per capita. This assumption is unlikely to be true given 
the heterogeneity of Guangdong's prefectures. This section is thus an attempt to examine 
conditional y^convergence and explore the factors shaping the steady-state output per 
capita level and growth performances of Guangdong's prefectures. Specifically, this 
section reports the empirical results based on the estimation of the growth equation 
introduced in section 4.2 with a panel of prefectural data for the period 1980-1998. 
Let us first recall the growth equation to be estimated: 
’ ie[0,n] and h[0，r] 
k=\ 
Based on this equation, four different regression models with different explanatory 
variables are estimated:兄 
Mode 丨 Variable 
1 DISTi, AFDIu, MRit, MVEu, A/", A P 腿 A 
2 DISTi, AEXPORTit, MRu, ATVEu, A/", D, 
3 MOUNTi, DELTAi, MRu, ATVEu, A/", APRIMu, A 
36 In addition to regressing the four models, this study has attempted other regressions. For instance, we 
intend to examine the impacts of other variables, including the average year of schooling and 
transportation density, on growth. However, both variables turn out to be insignificant in all regressions. 
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4 MOUNTi, DELTAi, MRu, Mn(TVEu), AIu, Mn(PRIMit), A 
In these models, the impact of geography, openness and fiscal decentralization 
are investigated using different proxies proposed in section 4.2. As detailed in the table 
above, the major differences among the four regressions pertain to the use of DIST’ 
AFDI and ^EXPORT, as opposed to MOUNT, DELTA as proxies for geography and 
openness. One purpose of experimenting with these four models is to find out how 
sensitive the estimates are to the different specifications. It is also worth repeating that 
some of the proxies may be endogenous, e.g., FDI, EXPORT and TVE, and the resulting 
estimates may be biased. In view of this problem, DELTA may be a better proxy for 
openness than FDI or EXPORT. This is one of the reasons why models 3 and 4 may be 
better choices if the problem of endogeneity turns out to be serious. 
Prior to estimating these four models, the panel unit root tests are performed to 
find out whether the variables are stationary. While growth rate as the dependent 
variable is stationary according to the panel unit root tests, some of the independent 
variables are not (See Appendix III for detailed discussion). The non-stationary variables 
such as FDI and TVE are thus first differenced before estimating the four models in 
order to get around the problem of spurious regression. 
The empirical results of model 1 to 4 are presented in tables 6.7, 6.8, 6.9 and 
6.10 respectively. To be precise, simple pooling, fixed-effects and random-effects 
models corresponding to each of the above equations are all presented in these tables. In 
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each case, the model selection procedure outlined in Figure 5.1 is followed. The results 
based on the model selection procedure are summarized in table 6.6. Different models 
are chosen for the four regression models. For example, column 1 of table 6.6 presents 
the results for model 1 above. The first step involves the choice between simple pooling 
and the fixed-effects models. Since the F-statistics, which takes the value of 2.906, is 
sufficiently high, the null hypothesis of homogenous intercepts is rejected and thus a 
simple pooling model should not be used. Next, the Hausman test is earned out to 
determine if a random-effects model is preferred to a fixed-effects model. With a 
Hausman statistics of 17.759, the null hypothesis is again rejected and thus a fixed-
effects model is selected eventually. Analogously, a fixed-effects model is chosen for 
model 2, while the random-effects model is selected for both model 3 and 4. 
There is one last point on model selection that should perhaps be clarified at the 
outset. As far as the fixed-effects model is concerned, a moment's reflections suggest 
that the dummies for the prefectures and some of the explanatory variables such as DIST 
are linearly dependent. Thus, in so far as the fixed-effects model is selected with all the 
prefecture-specific dummies, some of the explanatory variables have to be dropped. A 
case in point is DIST in models 1 and 2，the prefecture-specific fixed effects capture all 
the geography-related effects and thus DIST cannot be separately identified. In other 
words, the fixed effects a; already capture the effect of distance from the coast. 
Much care has been exercised to ensure that other estimation issues including 
heteroscedasticity, serial correlation, endogeneity and misspecification of the model are 
properly addressed. If any of these problems is detected in our model, remedial measures 
are taken. Since the model is altered after taking into account the above problems, it is 
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necessary to repeat the model selection procedures again in light of the problems. In 
other words, the test procedure is only halted until the model is not subject to any 
econometric problems. The statistics with respect to the various tests may be found in 
tables 6.7 - 6.10. From the Jarque-Bera statistics reported in tables 6.7 - 6.10, the 
residuals are not normally distributed in all regression models. This may thus introduce 
some estimation biases in the hypothesis testing. While we have already employed all 
available data for the regression exercises, the problem may probably be minimized^^. 
There is not much we can do in this stage given the limitation in gathering data. Other 
than the above estimation issue, the fixed effects model presented in table 6.7 seems to 
be plagued by the problem of misspecification. According to the Ramsey reset2 statistics, 
the null hypothesis is not rejected at 5 per cent, indicating that there are some powers of 
variables omitted from this regression model. To tackle this problem, we attempt to 
include higher powers of variables in the equation. However, none of them turns out to 
be significant. After addressing all the estimation issues, the rest of this section will go 
through and interpret the empirical findings of the four regression models separately 
summarized in tables 6.7 - 6.10. 
This study first experiments with two estimations using the shortest distance 
from coast (DIST) as a proxy for geography (i.e. models 1 and 2). The two models, 
which are presented in table 6.7 and 6.8, differ only in the measure of openness. To be 
precise, the first difference of foreign direct investment ratio (AFDI) and that of export 
to GDP ratio (AEXPORT) are included in models 1 and 2 respectively. While these two 
variables have often been used as proxies for openness, some economists have argued 
37 According to the central limit theorem, the t, F and x^ statistics will be properly distributed when the 
sample size is sufficiently large. 
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that they may suffer from the problem of endogeneity (Frankel and Romer (1999)). This 
point should be keep in mind when interpreting the results based on models 1 and 2. 
Recalling the tests of selecting panel data models, the fixed-effects model is selected for 
both models. 
Since the first two models are quite similar, we shall group them together in our 
discussion on the empirical results. Tables 6.7 and 6.8 summarize the estimates for the 
simple pooling, fixed-effects model and random-effects model. The model selection 
procedure selects the fixed-effects model, i.e., column 2 of table 6.7 and table 6.8. In all 
the models, the estimated coefficients by and large have the same signs and magnitudes. 
In view of this, our discussion will focus on the fixed-effects model which is also the 
model chosen by the model selection procedure. The coefficient of ln(y^/) is both 
negative and significant. This implies that there is conditional /^-convergence in 
Guangdong. Next, we discuss how the proxies for geography, openness and fiscal 
decentralization perform. As already alluded to above, since the fixed-effects model is 
chosen for the two models, any right-hand-side variables remaining constant over time 
cannot be included as explanatory variables because they are linear combinations of the 
dummies. ^^  In the present context, DIST has to be dropped. While the effect of DIST 
cannot be separately identified, its impact on growth if any is now captured by the 
prefecture-specific intercept term a,，which incorporates all the location-specific 
advantages of Guangdong's prefectures. If a,- is highly correlated with DIST, then it 
may serve as a proxy for the impact of distance from the cost of economic growth. 
However, the results of models 1 and 2, however, do not indicate a negative relationship 
38 Otherwise, the regression will be exposed to the problem of perfect collinearity. 
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between DIST and <2严.One possible explanation is that there may be other location-
specific factors, which vary substantially across Guangdong's prefectures and affect 
their growth performances. Though it is not certain what the impact of DIST on growth 
is, we may find some clues from estimates based on the simple pooling and the random-
effects models whereby the effect of DIST may be separately identified. As reported in 
column 1 and column 3 in Tables 6.7 and 6.8，distance from the coast seems to exert a 
negative effect on growth. 
From column 2 of table 6.7 and 6.8, AFDI and AEXPORT avQ not significant in 
the two models. However, as pointed our before, AFDI and ^EXPORT may be 
endogenous and one should be careful in interpreting this result. This is the reason why 
DELTA is used as an exogenous proxy for openness in the other models to be discussed 
below. 
Next, fiscal decentralization affects growth positively and significantly. Both the 
marginal retention rate {MR) and the first difference of TVEs share {MVE) are 
significant at 5 per cent. To be precise, a one per cent increase in the marginal retention 
rate will boost economic growth approximately by 0.09 per cent. Moreover, if the rate 
of change ofTVEs share is increased by one per cent, the growth rate will be about 0.60 
higher. 
The remaining variables are all statistically significant. The rate of change of 
investments (A/) exerts positive impact on growth, while the rate of change of primary 
share (APRIM) impedes economic growth. Finally, as predicted, the growth 
For instance, the a, of Zhaoqing is higher than that of Guangzhou, despite Zhaoqing has a DIST 
doubling that of Guangzhou. 
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performances of Guangdong's prefectures are boosted by the Deng's southern tour. The 
dummy variable (D), which takes a positive value, indicates that all prefectures in 
Guangdong have experienced a permanent jump in the rate of economic growth since 
1992. 
In sum, both model 1 and 2 suggest that fiscal decentralization is conducive to 
economic growth. In so far as geography is concerned, the random-effects and simple-
pooling model seem to suggest that distance from the coast may have a negative impact 
on growth. The measures of openness do not enter the regression significantly. In so far 
as AFDI and ^EXPORT are likely to be endogenous in the model, the estimates from 
these estimations may not be very reliable. In other words, the above results should not 
be readily taken as a rejection of the hypothesis that openness stimulates economic 
growth. As discussed in chapter four, DELTA may be a more appropriate measure for 
openness in Guangdong. The problem of endogeneity may be tackled in so far as 
DELTA is exogenous. 
Unlike the last two models, MOUNT and DELTA replace DIST and AFD/ (or 
^EXPORT) in both models 3 and 4. Model 4 contains the same variables as model 3, 
except that the TVEs share and primary share enter the model in first log differences'^^. 
In other words, the rate of change of TVE and PRIM are not linearly related with growth 
in model 4. 
Based on our model selection procedure outlined in Figure 5.1, the random-
effects model is selected for models 3 and 4, though it is useful to point out that the 
40 First log differences = ln(A;)-ln(不_/) are employed since \x\{TVE) and \w{PRIM) are non-stationary series 
(See the results in table 6.5). 
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results are similar to those derived from the fixed-effects and simple-pooling models. As 
reported in column 3 of table 6.9 and 6.10, the coefficient of ln(y/") is both negative and 
significant at 5 per cent, indicating that there is conditional /^convergence in 
Guangdong. Since the random-effects model is selected for models 3 and 4，the impact 
of geography on growth may be directly examined through incorporating MOUNT into 
the model. With a negative coefficient of MOUNT, the growth rate of a prefecture will 
decline if there is an additional county located in the mountainous region. It is 
interesting to point out that this finding is consistent with the results when DIST is used 
in the first and second model discussed above. This is not surprising because regions 
farther away from the coast are also those that are mountainous. In other words, the 
results are robust with respect to DZSTand MOUNT as proxies for geography. 
With regard to openness, the positive sign of the estimated coefficient oi DELTA 
suggests that prefecture located in the Pearl River Delta has experienced faster economic 
growth throughout the period 1980-1998. While MR and ATVE (or Mn(TVE)) are 
positive and statistically significant in the two models, fiscal decentralization is 
conducive to economic growth. 
The empirical results of other variables are consistent with that of models 1 and 
2. From column 3 of table 6.9 and 6.10，both INVEST and D (i.e. Deng's tour) exert a 
positive impact on growth. Moreover, with a negative coefficient of tJ^RIM (or 
^\x\{PRIM)), the relative size of the primary sector depresses the growth performances of 
Guangdong's prefectures. 
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The major differences of the results derived from the four models pertain to the 
coefficients of the proxies for openness and geography. Nonetheless, the estimates for 
other explanatory variables are robust in all four models. In view of our discussion in 
chapter four on the endogeneity of FDI and EXPORT and the possible effect of 
introducing bias in the estimates, our judgements is to put more weight on the results of 
models 3 and 4. The last two models are in fact very similar though model 4 seems to 
have a better fit with a higher adjusted R-squared. For the sake of simplicity, the rest of 
this study will focus on the empirical findings of model 4. 
6.4 Summary and Interpretation of Major Findings 
This section summarizes the salient features of our findings. Through the lens of 
convergence analysis, the above findings suggest that there is no cr-convergence among 
Guangdong's prefectures during the period 1980-2001. In other words, income 
dispersion did not decline in the province. Moreover, notwithstanding the lack of 
evidence of unconditional y0-convergence, there is conditional y5-convergence among 
Guangdong's prefectures. With these findings, we conjecture that Guangdong's 
prefectures, which vary in terms of such factors as geographical location and degree of 
openness, converge to different steady states in the long run. Most probably, rich 
prefectures grow faster than their poor neighbours since (1) the steady-state output per 
capita levels of rich prefectures are higher and (2) the rich prefectures, with higher initial 
capital-labour ratio, are farther away from their own steady states. Accordingly, rich 
prefectures diverge from poor prefectures over time, resulting in a widening of intra-
provincial disparities in Guangdong. 
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The results derived from the models above seem to suggest that growth rate is 
simultaneously influenced by the geography, degree of openness and institutions. Unlike 
Alcala and Ciccone (2002), Easterly and Levine (2002) and Rodrik et al. (2002), our 
empirical results indicate that having a larger number of mountainous counties tends to 
be associated with slower growth, holding institutions constant. In other words, 
geography affects growth of Guangdong's prefectures directly through channels other 
than trade liberalization or fiscal decentralization. One would conjecture that the high 
altitude of mountainous regions and their rugged terrain raise the transportation costs of 
raw materials and finished products, thereby reducing the gains from domestic 
production. As a consequence, production activities shift towards other areas such as the 
lowland plains, rendering the mountainous areas largely undeveloped. Similar 
conclusion is reached by Demurger (2001)，except that provincial-level data is employed 
in his study. 
Apart from this, prefectures located within the Pearl River Delta tend to grow 
faste/i . As discussed in chapter two, after the formation of the Pearl River Delta Open 
Coastal Economic Zone in the early 1980s, a substantial amount of foreign direct 
investment poured into these areas. This may not only enhance the technological 
spillovers from foreign countries to the delta region, but also intensify the competition 
among domestic firms and force them to improve the production efficiency. Moreover, 
through trading with other countries, firms operating in the delta may expand their 
“ W h i l e growth rate of GDP per capita varies across those prefectures located in the Pearl River Delta, it 
is also interesting to explore the forces shaping the differences in their growth performances. To achieve 
this, we may perform an empirical investigation using only the data on prefectures located within the delta 
region. Moreover, some other variables may be included in the new regression model so as to improve its 
adjusted R-squared. 
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production and hence benefit from economies of scale. Thus, prefectures located in the 
Pearl River Delta experienced an annual growth rate exceeding other Guangdong's 
prefectures by 3.484 per cent during the past twenty years. 
Our empirical results seem to suggest that fiscal decentralization is conducive to 
economic growth. Since both MR and Aln(7TE) are positively and significantly related 
with growth, this study concludes that the benefits of fiscal decentralization outweigh 
the costs. As predicted by traditional theory, governments at lower levels have more 
information about local tastes and may cater better to local needs. Thus, shifting fiscal 
power to local governments will improve the efficiency of resources allocation. 
Moreover, the growth of township and village enterprises is induced by fiscal 
decentralization. Not only are TVEs more efficient than SOEs, they may also transfer 
surplus rural labour to industrial production. Thus, fiscal decentralization exerts positive 
impact on economic growth through enhancing the development of TVEs in addition to 
improving the efficiency of resources allocation. This result is consistent with that of Lin 
and Liu (2000), though their estimations are based on the data at the provincial level. 
The results derived from estimating the growth equation suggest interesting 
insights on the increasing trend of intra-provincial inequalities revealed by the cr-
convergence results. The subject of the next section is to explore how such factors as 
geography, openness and fiscal decentralization exert their impact on prefectural growth 
and ultimately on inter-prefecture inequalities. 
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6.5 Guangdong's Intra-provincial Disparities in Light of the Empirical Results 
There is a tight link between intra-provincial disparities in Guangdong (based on 
the results on cr-convergence) and the forces shaping inter-prefecture economic growth. 
Geography, openness, fiscal decentralization and other factors exert their impact on 
prefectural economic growth. In turn, differential growth rates affect the differences in 
GDP per capita among prefectures, ultimately affecting the trend of intra-provincial 
disparities. Thus, the empirical findings based on the growth equation above help shed 
light on the trend of intra-provincial disparities derived from the cr-convergence analysis, 
a topic to be explored in the rest of this section. As shown below, the empirical findings 
are particularly illuminating in shedding light on the increase in income dispersion 
between the Pearl River delta and non-delta region that accounts for much of 
Guangdong's overall intra-provincial inequalities. 
Based on the models estimated, geography has an important impact on growth, 
with either mountainous terrain {MOUNT) or distance from the cost {DIST) all exerting a 
negative impact on growth. As discussed in chapter two, mountainous districts farther 
away from the coast are concentrated in the north, while lowland plains are in the south 
of Guangdong, especially the Pearl River Delta. The rugged terrain in the north and the 
high cost of developing transport infrastructure contrasts sharply with the excellent 
transport network and infrastructure in the non-mountainous region. More precisely, the 
number of highways within the non-mountainous regions far exceeded that of 
mountainous regions in 1998. The many waterways crisscrossing the delta region also 
help lower transportation costs. This implies that the transportation cost of raw material 
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in low-lying areas is decreasing over time, rendering their domestic production more 
efficient, ultimately resulting in the agglomeration of economic activities in the non-
mountainous coastal region of Guangdong. Our empirical findings with respect to the 
impact of geography on growth therefore help account for the widening of the income 
gap between the Pearl River Delta and the rest of the province. 
One may also infer from our findings that openness is a key factor accounting for 
Guangdong's increasing intra-provincial inequalities, especially inequalities between the 
Pearl River Delta and the rest of the province. Let us recall that the coefficient of 
DELTA is statistically significant and has a positive sign, indicating that openness is 
important in explaining the differential economic growth within Guangdong. Due to the 
implementation of preferential policies during the 1980s reinforced by the geographical 
proximity to Hong Kong, prefectures located in the delta have attracted the bulk of 
foreign direct investment and engaged actively in outward processing. This may enhance 
technological spillovers from foreign countries to the Pearl River Delta. With 
geographical factors and preferential policies reinforcing each other, it is not at all 
surprising that the increase in overall intra-provincial inequality of Guangdong is largely 
due to the inter-regional inequality between the Pearl River Delta and the rest of the 
province. 
In conjunction with geography and openness, fiscal decentralization through the 
fiscal contracts and TVEs also exert a positive influence on growth. How the evolution 
of fiscal decentralization on Guangdong's intra-provincial disparities is also worth 
exploring. As alluded to in Chapter Two, prefectures in the Pearl River Delta such as 
Shenzhen were granted more discretionary fiscal powers and high-incentive fiscal 
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contracts, though the rest of the province gradually caught up with the marginal 
retention rates converging to 100 per cent for all Guangdong's prefectures after 1991. In 
so far as the fiscal decentralization exerts a positive impact on growth, one would 
therefore expect that fiscal decentralization might initially exert a disequalizing impact 
but poor prefectures will catch up with their rich neighbours so that such an impact 
might cater paribus be reserved in the 1990s. Fiscal decentralization has also set off a 
more rapid development of township and village enterprises. As TVEs expand more 
rapidly within the delta region, the positive impact of TVEs on growth may be higher. 
Holding all other things constant, this may result in a widening of intra-provincial 
inequalities in Guangdong. 
Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has identified an upward trend of intra-provincial disparities and 
explored the forces shaping the disparate income differences within Guangdong. Our 
empirical results indicate that geography, openness and fiscal decentralization are key 
determinants of growth. While differential growth rates ultimately determine the level of 
GDP per capita, we conjecture that the three factors, which vary largely across different 




Conclusion and Policy Implications 
In this chapter, we first summarize the major findings that are pertinent to the 
trend of intra-provincial disparities and factors underlying the income gap among 
Guangdong's prefectures. Next, as there are concerns regional inequalities may induce 
political instability and social unrest and may ultimately undermine economic 
performances, this study tries to address the issue by drawing policy implications from 
the empirical findings. Finally, the limitations and possible extensions of this study are 
discussed at the end of this chapter. 
7.1 Summary of Salient Findings 
As demonstrated in chapter four, there is an upward trend of intra-provincial 
disparities in Guangdong during the period 1980-2001. Our results indicate that neither 
cr-convergence nor unconditional y9-convergence has happened in Guangdong. In other 
words, rich prefectures grow faster than the poor ones and hence there is no catch-up 
phenomenon among them. Nevertheless, there is the evidence of conditional 
convergence among its prefectures. Since two types of /^-convergence do not coincide, 
we conclude that the steady-state output per capita levels are not equivalent across 
Guangdong's prefectures. This implies that the income differences among them will 
persist in the long run. 
More importantly, the factors affecting growth performances of Guangdong's 
prefectures are explored through estimating a Barro-type growth equation. Our empirical 
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findings suggest that openness, fiscal decentralization, rate of change of investment ratio 
and Deng's tour are conducive to economic growth. On the other hand, the unfavorable 
geographical location and rate of change of primary sector exert a negative impact on 
growth. All the results, except the one for openness, are robust in the four regression 
models. To be specific, the degree of openness appears to be significant only when it is 
measured by an exogenous variable (i.e. DELTA). Based on the empirical results, the 
heterogeneous conditions of geography, openness and fiscal decentralization across 
Guangdong's prefectures seem to account for the upward trend of intra-provincial 
disparities. 
7.2 Policy Implications 
The upward trend of intra-provincial disparities in Guangdong during the period 
1980-2001 amid rapid economic growth has attracted much attention in the policy arena. 
There are concerns that regional inequalities may induce political instability and social 
unrest and may ultimately undermine economic performances. It is thus essential to 
explore whether the trend will be reversed in the near future. If not, should the 
government introduce measures to mitigate the problem? In this section, we attempt to 
explore these questions by drawing policy implications from the empirical findings. 
Economists and policymakers do not have a consensus on what should be done 
about regional disparities. In view of rising regional disparities, there is a growing 
pressure on policymakers to intervene directly to address the problem. For example, 
with TVEs underdeveloped in poor prefectures, it is tempting, based on our empirical 
findings, to suggest that local governments should actively promote township and 
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village enterprises in poor prefectures. To achieve this, perhaps the government of poor 
regions may, for example guarantee bank loans for TVEs and provide them with more 
financial support (Bui et al. (2003)). However, such measures may produce undesirable 
outcomes. TVEs will probably face softer budget constraint with greater financial 
support and may produce outputs less efficiently. In other words, the above policies may 
neither stimulate the growth of poor prefectures nor reduce the income dispersion among 
Guangdong's prefectures 
While our findings, for example, support the view that TVEs promote economic 
growth, it is by no means a logical corollary to suggest that government intervention is 
the answer. In fact, our findings seem to lend support to a strategy that helps unleashed 
market forces and dismantles the barriers impeding flows of goods and factors between 
prefectures. Indeed, our findings seem to complement a different view commonly found 
among economists that market forces may eventually lead to income convergence. In 
this respect, let us review three variants of this view. Some economists (See, for example, 
Cai et al. (2002) and Chen and Fleisher (1996)) have argued that free flows of factor 
inputs will resolve the problem. Labour migration may help alleviate the problem of 
uneven development among different regions. To earn a higher income, people residing 
in a poor region will choose to work in a rich region. Those migrants working in rich 
regions will then send remittances back to home to support their families. This may 
probably promote the level of income per capita in poor regions and thereby reduce 
regional inequalities. 
42 For instance, similar measures taken by the provincial governments in 1993 failed to boost their 
economic growth. 
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Another view emphasizes the spillover effects from rich to poor regions. As 
discussed in Brun et al. (2002), poor regions may benefit from the growth of their richer 
neighbours. As long as there is trading of commodities, technology and management 
skills may diffuse from the rich to poor regions and thereby regional inequalities will be 
ameliorated. This view is consistent with the policy objective of Deng. During the 1980s, 
he stepped up the reform of such prefectures as Shenzhen and Zhuhai and hoped that 
other Guangdong prefectures may catch up eventually. 
Finally, Henderson (1999) has put forward another theory on why regional 
disparities will be automatically addressed by market forces. Given that there may 
initially be an agglomeration of production activities leading to regional disparities, 
market forces may eventually bring about income convergence. The intuition is as 
follows. In order to economize the transportation costs, production plants will cluster 
around location with good market access during the early stage of development. But 
once the region becomes congested, further investment will no longer generate 
considerable profits. Production activities will then move away from the existing 
location and concentrate in other areas, resulting in the formation of new production 
centres. If this view is correct, then agglomeration and congestion in the Pearl River 
Delta may ultimately induce firms moving their operations inland. 
Underlying all these views seem to be the assumption that there are free flows of 
goods and factors of production for the above market forces to work and there are no 
man-made barriers impeding these flows. This view is interesting in light of our 
findings. In a sense our results support this view. For example, an increase in openness 
stimulates economic growth by allowing free flow of goods. Fiscal decentralization has 
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led to the development of TVEs which are more market-oriented. However, in so far as 
the extent of openness and fiscal decentralization varies across Guangdong's prefectures 
due to preferential policies in favour of certain regions (e.g., designating Shenzhen as a 
special economic zone or granting the Delta region with special policies favourable to 
trade and investment), the result may actually have increased intra-provincial 
inequalities as our previous discussion has suggested. Our empirical findings therefore 
seem to suggest that the degree of openness and fiscal decentralization should actually 
be increased so their growth-enhancing effect may benefit the less developed 
prefectures. Without such man-made barriers as region-based preferential policies, the 
market forces suggested by the different views above may then be unshackled. In the 
same view, there are barriers not discussed that may help. Among them are the 
relaxation of the household registration system and measures to tackle the problem of 
local protectionism that have impeded the free flow of goods, capital and labour. 
Instead of intervening the market, it is therefore better for policymakers to extend 
the preferential measures to all the prefectures in Guangdong so that they may compete 
on a level playing field. In so far as openness {DELTA) may exert positive impact on 
economic growth, the government should remove those policy-induced barriers from 
poor prefectures. For example, they should enjoy the same tax exemptions or tax 
holidays to foreign investors as those in the Delta region (Fujita and Hu (2001)). This 
may attract foreign investments to poor prefectures and thereby boost their growth 
performances. Accordingly, poor prefectures may catch up with their richer neighbours, 
resulting in a decline in intra-provincial disparities in Guangdong. 
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The government should minimize their control over the prefectures through those 
preferential measures and focus on the activities that it has comparative advantage and 
less subject to government failures, e.g., the provision of public infrastructure to the 
domestic economy that may generate positive externality. As discussed in section 6.4, 
mountainous regions {MOUNT) may have some adverse topographical conditions that 
render their economic development difficult. To speed up the reform in these areas, the 
governments may improve the transportation network and telecommunication facilities 
in the mountainous regions (Demurger (2001)) that may generate substantial external 
effects. This may substantially lower the transportation costs and attract an increasing 
amount of investment to mountainous areas. 
After drawing the policy implications from the empirical findings, we finally 
discuss the limitations of this study. As pointed out in chapter five, the result for 
openness is not robust in our regression models. The degree of openness is significant 
only when it is measured by DELTA (i.e. an exogenous variable). If there are more data 
available, it is conceivable to extend this study in several ways. First, better proxies may 
be employed to examine the impact of geography, openness and fiscal decentralization 
on growth in future studies. For instance, the size of labour force may be included in the 
model to study how agglomeration determines the spatial distribution of income. With 
more cross-section observations in the data set, a predicted trade share, which is 
constructed through estimating a gravity model from Frankel and Romer (1999), may act 
as a proxy for openness. Moreover, the extra-budgetary funds, which are not subject to 
the sharing with central government, may also be incorporated in the model to reflect the 
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degree of fiscal decentralization in China (Jin et al. (2001)). Second, a similar empirical 
framework may be applied to study other provinces that have experienced glaring intra-
provincial inequalities (e.g. Fujian, Jiangsu and Sichuan, etc.). Finally, as discussed in 
Jones et al. (2003), the differences in growth performance are particularly conspicuous 
at the county level. It is thus interesting to extend the study from the prefectural to 
county level if the data are available. 
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Appendix III 
Data Sources and Variable Definitions 
The empirical estimation is based on annual data for 21 prefectures in 
Guangdong from 1980 to 1998. Due to the reorganization of administrative units over 
time, some county-level cities in Guangdong have been upgraded to prefectures and took 
the control over counties from other prefectures since 1980. To avoid any inconsistency 
of the data, this study employs the data which are adjusted according to the latest 
classification of administrative units. All of them are from Guangdong Statistics 1949 -
1998 {Guangdong wushi nian), Guangdong Statistical Yearbook and Guangdong 
Agricultural Statistical Yearbook, unless specified. The definitions of variables which 
are used in our estimation are listed below: 
Variables Definition 
GDPG Growth rate of real GDP per capita. They are derived from the real GDP per 
capita index series which is measured in comparable prices. 
Y Real GDP per capita. 
FDI Total value of foreign capital utilized {Shiji liyong waizi) divided by GDP, 
in percentage terms. To convert foreign capital utilized from US dollar to 
renminbi, the official exchange rate is used. 
EXPORT Total value of foreign exports divided by GDP, in percentage terms. To 
convert foreign exports from US dollar to renminbi, the official exchange 
rate is used. 
DIST The shortest distance between the location of prefectural government and 
the coast. 
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MOUNT Number of counties which belong to mountainous regions. 
Source: Summary for Economic Indicators of Counties, 2000. {Zhongguo 
xianshi shehui jingji tongji gaiyao, 2000) 
MR Percentage of the revenue increments retained by prefectural governments. 
Sources : 
• Guangdong fagui giiizhang huibian 1984-86, 1987-88 and 1989-90 
• Guangdong zhengbao 1994(3) 
• Shizhi (Chaozhou, Dongguan, Foshan" Guangzhou, Jiangmen, 
Maoming, Meizhou, Shantou, Shaogiian, Zhaoqing, Zhongshan, Zhuhai) 
拳 Xianzhi (Heyuan, Jieyang, Qingyuan, Yangjiang, Yunfu). 
TVE Number of workers of township and village enterprises over total employed 
persons {Shehui congye renyuan), in percentage terms. 
/ Total investment in fixed asset {quan shehui guding zichan touzi) over GDP, 
in percentage terms. 
PRIM Real output from primary sector divided by real GDP, in percentage terms. 
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Appendix III 
Testing Conditional Convergence in Panel Data Models (Islam (1995)) 
While the growth equation proposed by Barro (1991) is designed for cross-
section estimation, this appendix introduces the one from Islam (1995) that is unique for 
panel data estimation. Although both equations are derived from the neoclassical model, 
they differ in the term of log GDP per capita. To be precise, 111(7/-/), instead of the initial 
value ln(y/.^), is included in the equation for panel estimation. There is conditional [5-
convergence if the coefficient of is both negative and significant. The derivation 
of the growth equation in Islam (1995) is summarized as follows: 
The Cobb-Douglas production function with labour augmenting technology is defined 
as: 
/(/)=水/)尺(/广丄(/广《 (Al) 
where L{t) = L(0)e"' ， A{t) = 
Assume s is the share of capital invested and is the depreciation rate: 
k = sy(t)-(n+g + S)k(0 = sk(tr-(fi+g + S)k(0 (A2) 
where k(t) = K{t) / A{t)L{t) and y(0 = 7(0 / A(t)L(t) 
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At the steady state, 
1 a / ~ / N-~ � e I-a . a �1 一 a 
k = - ^ , j) = - ( A 3 ) 
The speed of convergence around the steady state is given by: 
= 本 ( f ) — l n _ ) (A4) 
where A = (« + g + - d) 
This equation implies that: 
= ， … 2 - t � (A5) 
Subtracting each side by ln(j)(/,)): 
In(i)fe)) - ln(i)(g) 二（1 - (1 - (A6) 
Substituting y* into (A6), the equation becomes 
ln(j)(,2)) - In(KO) 二 (1 - 厂 Y ^ l n C O — (1 — +g + S)(八乃 
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Appendix III 
Test for the Stationarity of Variables 
As a prelude to estimating the growth equation depicted in section 4.2，the tests 
for spurious regression are earned out. First, the stationarity of variables are examined 
through performing a panel unit root test (i.e. the IPS test). Next, this study experiments 
with two methods to tackle the problem of non-stationarity. Based on the results 
presented in table 6.7，6.12 and 6.13, this study suggests that non-stationary variables 
should be adjusted by first differencing. 
We begin by checking the stationarity of each variable. From the results of panel 
unit root tests presented in table 6.11, the series of per capita GDP growth rate for some 
prefectures are stationary over time. Nevertheless, other explanatory variables such as 
GDP per capita, investment, export, township and village enterprises，primary sector and 
foreign direct investment appear to be non-stationary processes'^^ Since our dependent 
and independent variables are integrated with different orders, it is not necessary to 
perform the test for cointegration. 
The regression with respect to these variables, however, may not allow us to 
unravel the forces of growth since the coefficients of non-stationary variables may 
probably be statistically insignificant. According to Banerjee et al. (1993), when a 1(0) 
variable is regressed on 1(1) variables, the only way to make OLS estimators consistent 
is to drive all coefficients of 1(1) variables to zero. To see exactly what happen if non-
All individual series of investment ratio contain unit root in the presence of a linear time trend. 
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stationary series are used, this study estimates a growth equation using level data and 
reports the results in column 2 of table 6.12. 44 As predicted, the non-stationary variables 
including FDIt and PRIM, are not significant at 5 per cent. Moreover, the adjusted R-
squared from this regression (i.e. 0.261) is exceptionally low. This finding confirms that 
a large proportion of growth cannot be explained by 1(1) variables. Thus, some 
adjustments should be made on the data. 
To our knowledge, there are two ways adopted in previous studies to address the 
problem. Demurger (2001) estimates a similar equation by using three-year weighted 
moving averages"^^ for all variables so as to eliminate short-term fluctuations. Following 
Demurger (2001)，we regress the weighted moving average of growth rate on a set of 
weighted moving average data. The empirical results of this model are presented in 
column 3 of table 6.13.46 Though the adjusted R-squared improves slightly to 0.294，this 
regression is plagued by the problem of serial correlation. The Durbin-Watson statistics 
takes the value of 0.541, indicating that the residuals are serially con-elated. Moreover, 
the 1(1) variables including FDIt and PRIMt remain insignificant in the model. Most 
probably, the variables remain non-stationary after taking moving average and hence 
this method may not help overcome the problem. 
Jones (1995) provides us with another solution. To ensure that the left-hand and 
right-hand sides variables are integrated with the same order, he transforms investment, 
44 Since panel data is employed in the estimation, the test for data pooling should be earned out. From the 
F-statistics presented in table 6.11’ the fixed-effects model is selected for this model (i.e. model Al). 
45 The weighted moving average 兄,=(不’,-i + 2 x X^ ^ + 义,•…)/ 4 . To prevent any overlapping 
with the dependent variables, the measure of conditional convergence (i.e. GDP per capita) is lagged by 
two period. 
46 According to the results of data pooling from table 6.11, a random-effects model should be formulated 
this time. 
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which is a non-stationary variable, to 1(0) series by first differencing. Then the first 
difference of investment was used to estimate an endogenous growth model. To see 
whether this method may help alleviate our problem, we estimate the growth equation 
after applying first differencing to non-stationary series"^ .^ Column 2 of table 6.7 reports 
the results of this r e g r e s s i o n . 4 8 As shown in the table, the adjusted R-squared reaches 
0.377 after making the adjustments. Moreover, other test statistics, such as the DW 
statistics, clearly demonstrate that the regression is not subject to any estimation 
problems. Given the above findings, this study suggests that the non-stationary series 
should be first-differenced before estimating the growth equation. 
47 The non-stationary variables including /„ FDI,, EXPORT,, TVE, and PRIM, are first differenced prior to 
estimating our growth equation. Though the GDP per capita demonstrates an 1(1) series, first differencing 
is not applied as it is restricted by the model to act as a measure of conditional convergence. 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6.1 Decomposition of Total Disparities by Theil's Entropy Measure 
Inter Intra Inter- Intra-
Year . Total regional regional . regional regional 
咖 quality inequality inequality 咖 j s j j f y mequahty( 
L ^ Zo) 
1980 0.12 0.08 0.04 63.39 36.61 
1981 0.12 0.08 0.04 66.00 34.00 
1982 0.13 0.08 0.05 65.31 34.69 
1983 0.15 0.10 0.06 64.15 35.85 
1984 0.18 0.12 0.07 64.32 35.68 
1985 0.21 0.13 0.08 63.55 36.45 
1986 0.21 0.13 0.07 64.83 35.17 
1987 0.20 0.13 0.07 64.02 35.98 
1988 0.21 0.13 0.08 62.97 37.03 
1989 0.23 0.14 0.08 63.72 36.28 
1990 0.26 0.17 0.09 64.91 35.09 
1991 0.30 0.19 0.10 64.62 35.38 
1992 0.32 0.22 0.10 67.66 32.34 
1993 0.33 0.23 0.10 70.03 29.97 
1994 0.31 0.22 0.09 71.38 28.62 
1995 0.31 0.22 0.09 70.82 29.18 
1996 0.32 0.23 0.09 70.52 29.48 
1997 0.34 0.23 0.10 69.53 30.47 
1998 0.35 0.24 0.11 68.75 31.25 
1999 0.36 0.26 0.11 70.68 29.32 
2000 0.40 0.29 0.11 72.69 27.31 
2001 0.42 0.31 0.11 74.06 25.94 
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Table 6.2 Test for yg-convergence for the Period 1980 - 2001 
Regression 1 
Independent variable is the average growth rate of GDP per capita during 
1980-2001 
1 860*** 
Log of per capita GDP in 1980 (21 ^ 4 ) 
No. of observations 21 
Adjusted R-squared 0.203 
Durbin-Watson statistics 2.098 
I D . . 0.556 Jarque-Bera test [Q 刀 
R — e y , s R E S E T 2 [0：508] 
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level 
Table 6.3 Test for yg-convergence for the Period 1980 - 1991 
Regression 2 
Independent variable is the average growth rate of GDP per capita during 
1980-1991 
1 7S6*** 
Log of per capita GDP in 1980 ' (1 /.UUo) 
No. of observations 21 
Adjusted R-squared 0.274 
Durbin-Watson statistics 1.503 
, D . . 2.162 
Jarque-Bera test [ � ^ 刑 
Ramsey's RESET2 [i.巧7] 
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level 
Table 6.4 Test for yg-convergence for the Period 1992 -2001 
Regression 3 
Independent variable is the average growth rate of GDP per capita during 
1992-2001 
1 491*** 
Log of per capita GDP in 1980 ( j ^ 搬 ） 
No. of observations 21 
Adjusted R-squared 0.065 
Durbin-Watson statistics 2.205 
, n . . 0.476 
Jarque-Bera test [q yggj 
0 294 
Ramsey's RESET2 [0'594] 
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level 
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Table 6.5 Panel Unit Root Tests 
With Intercepts only With Intercepts and Trends 
Variables ~ ~ ~ C r i t i c a l " " “ 1 C r i t i c a l ~ 
ADFl , ADFl , , … � 
value (5%) value (5%) 
Growth rate -2.142* -1.860 -2.618* -2.490 
GDP 0.704 -1.860 -1.281 -2.490 
FDI -1.515 -1.860 -2.163 -2.490 
Export ratio -0.718 -1.860 -2.125 -2.490 
Share of TVEs -1.299 -1.860 -2.326 -2.490 
Investment ratio -2.086* -1.860 -2.215 -2.490 
Share of Pr imary Sector -1.286 -1.860 -1.954 -2.490 
in(share of TVEs) -1.405 -1.860 -2.018 -2.490 
ln(share of pr imary sector) -0.625 -1.860 -2.105 -2.490 
Note: 
1. The null hypothesis assumes all individual series to be non-stationary, while the alternative 
hypothesis assumes that at least one individual series does not contain a unit root. 
2. *denotes statistical significance at the 5 per cent. 
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Table 6.6 Model Selection for Panel Data Models 
Model 1 2 3 4 
Simple Pooling vs Fixed-effects 
F statistics 2.906 2.81 1.773 1.725 
{a.p)={ai,p) 
p-value [.000] [.000] [.024] [.030] 
Fixed-effects Fixed-effects Fixed-effects Fixed-effects 
Fixed-effects vs Random-effects 
Hausman statistics 17.759 16.016 10.132 7.866 
p-value [.013] [.025] [.119] [.248] 
J « • ‘ [ • � � • ‘ Random- Random-
Fixed-effects Fixed-effects effects effects 
Fixed-effects Fixed-effects Random- Random-
belection ot Model Model Model effects Model effects Model 
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Table 6.12 Estimation Results of Model Al 
Model Simple Pooling Fixed-effects Random-effects 
ln(r,-/) 0.002 -0.007*** -0.025* 
(0.012) (0.020) (0.014) 
DIST -0.272*** - -0.329** 
(0.079) - (0.129) 
(AFDI) , -0.034 -0.117 -0.074 
(0.076) (0.074) (0.073) 
MR, 0.067*** 0.087*** 0.073*** 
(0.025) (0.026) (0.025) 
(ATVE), 0.599*** 0.593*** 0.636*** 
(0.159) (0.187) (0.171) 
(A/), 0.193*** 0.180*** 0.189*** 
(0.055) (0.053) (0.053) 
(APRIM), -1.176*** -0.999*** -1.095*** 
(0.224) (0.230) (0.221) 
D, 1.756* 4.139*** 2.716*** 
(1.017) (1.126) (1.022) 
Constant 3.972* - 4.334* 
(2.230) - (2.325) 
No. of observations 323 323 323 
Adjusted R-squared 0.294 0.377 0.282 
LM heteroscedasticity 2.333 1.138 2.430 
[0.127] [0.286] [0.119] 
Durbin-watson 1.709 2.035 1.662 
Jarque-Bera Test 597.959 750.217 -
[0.000] [0.000] 
Ramsey's reset2 0.028 4.483 -
[0.868] [0.035] 
Hausman's specification 11.463 4.767 7.566 
[0.245] [0.688] [0.578] 
Note: 
1. Standard errors are in parentheses, while p-values are in brackets. *** denotes statistical 
significance at the 1 percent level, while ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 5 and 10 
percent level respectively. 
2. Based on the F-statistics reported in table 6.6, the fixed-effects model is chosen. 
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Table 6.12 Estimation Results of Model Al 
Model Simple Pooling Fixed-effects Random-effects 
ln(y,.；) 0.002 -0.067*** -0.024* 
(0.013) (0.020) (0.014) 
DIST -0.269*** - -0.326** 
(0.080) - (0.128) 
(AEXPORT), -0.050 -0.057 -0.053 
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035) 
MR, 0.066*** 0.086*** 0.073*** 
(0.025) (0.026) (0.025) 
(AWE), 0.647*** 0.604*** 0.665*** 
(0.165) (0.189) (0.173) 
(A/), 0.183*** 0.171*** 0.180*** 
(0.056) (0.054) (0.053) 
{APRIM), -1.200*** -0.976*** -1.094*** 
(0.228) (0.234) (0.225) 
D, 1.853* 4.304*** 2.844*** 
(1.026) (1.143) (1.035) 
Constant 4.002* - 4.308* 
(2.235) - (2.328) 
No. of observations 321 321 321 
Adjusted R-squared 0.300 0.379 0.289 
LM heteroscedasticity 0.853 0.556 0.936 
[0.356] [0.456] [0.333] 
Durbin-watson 1.691 1.980 1.638 
Jarque-Bera Test 521.310 682.417 -
[0.000] [0.000] 
Ramsey's reset2 0.036 3.190 -
[0.849] [0.075] 
Hausman's specification test 11.496 7.159 8.095 
[0.243] [0.413] [0.525] 
Note: 
1. Standard errors are in parentheses, while p-values are in brackets. *** denotes statistical 
significance at the 1 percent level, while ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 5 and 10 
percent level respectively. 
2. Based on the F-statistics reported in table 6.6, the fixed-effects model is chosen. 
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Table 6.12 Estimation Results of Model Al 
Model Simple Pooling Fixed-effects Random-effects 
ln(y,.；) -0.042*** -0.064*** -0.048*** 
(0.015) (0.020) (0.016) 
MOUNT -0.458*** - -0.486** 
(0.165) - (0.216) 
DELTA 4.197*** - 4.482*** 
(1.159) - (1.402) 
MR, 0.093*** 0.085 *** 0.090 *** 
(0.025) (0.026) (0.025) 
(ATVE), 0.418*** 0.585*** 0.476*** 
(0.158) (0.186) (0.166) 
(•/), 0.197*** 0.183*** 0.192*** 
‘ (0.054) (0.054) (0.053) 
(APRIM), -0.974*** -0.951*** -0.983*** 
‘ (0.220) (0.229) (0.219) 
D, 3.263*** 3.882 *** 3.485 *** 
(1.041) (1.120) (1.042) 
Constant 0.728 - 1.027 
(2.272) - (2.372) 
No. of observations 325 325 325 
Adjusted R-squared 0.336 0.370 0.335 
LM heteroscedasticity 2.126 1.449 2.438 
[0.145] [0.229] [0.118] 
Durbin-watson 1.771 1.988 1.763 
Jarque-Bera test 776.993 844.575 -
[0.000] [0.000] 
Ramsey's reset2 2.645 3.837 -
[0.105] [0.051] 
Hausman's specification test 8.245 3.902 12.897 
[0.510] [0.690] [0.109] 
Note: 
1. Standard errors are in parentheses, while p-values are in brackets. *** denotes statistical 
significance at the 1 percent level, while ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 5 and 10 
percent level respectively. 
2. Based on the F-statistics reported in table 6.6，the random-effects model is chosen. 
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Table 6.12 Estimation Results of Model Al 
Model Simple Pooling Fixed-effects Random-effects 
ln(r,.,) -0.053*** -0.050*** -0.054*** 
(0.014) (0.019) (0.014) 
MOUNT -0.408*** - -0.416** 
(0.156) - (0.201) 
DELTA 3.397*** - 3.484*** 
(1.084) - (1.305) 
MR, 0.085*** 0.071*** 0.081*** 
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023) 
(Aln(7y£)), 14.346*** 13.590*** 13.929*** 
(2.924) (2.989) (2.902) 
(A/), 0.135*** 0.140*** 0.136*** 
(0.051) (0.050) (0.050) 
{^\n(PRIM)), -33.133*** -36.036*** -34.210*** 
(4.989) (5.469) (5.046) 
D, 3.379*** 3.060*** 3.372*** 
(0.990) (1.085) (0.995) 
Constant 0.930 - 1.350 
(2.128) - (2.214) 
No. of observations 325 325 325 
Adjusted R-squared 0.414 0.443 0.414 
LM heteroscedasticity 1.025 0.421 1.030 
[0.311] [0.516] [0.310] 
Durbin-watson 1.765 1.996 1.762 
Jarque-Bera test 485.225 447.973 -
[0.000] [0.000] 
Ramsey's reset2 2.512 2.846 -
[0.114] [0.093] 
Hausman's specification test 7.264 9.393 11.139 
[0.610] [0.153] [0.133] 
Note: 
1. Standard errors are in parentheses, while p-values are in brackets. *** denotes statistical 
significance at the 1 percent level, while ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 5 and 10 
percent level respectively. 
2. Based on the F-statistics reported in table 6.6，the random-effects model is chosen. 
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Table 6.11 Model Selection for Panel Data Models Al and A2 
Mode 丨 Al A2 
Simple Pooling vs Fixed-effects 
( F 二tff cs 2.490 5.567 
p-value [.001] [.000] 
Fixed-effects Fixed-effects 
Fixed-effects vs Random-effects 
Hausman statistics 21.504 5.593 
p-value [.000] [.133] 
Fixed-effects Random-effects 
Selection of Model Fixed-effects Model Random-effects Model 
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Table 6.12 Estimation Results of Model Al 
Model Simple Pooling Fixed-effects Random-effects 
ln(r,./) -0.053*** -0.089*** -0.064*** 
(0.015) (0.025) (0.018) 
DIST -0.209*** - -0.246* 
(0.064) - (0.130) 
FDI, -0.001 -0.047 -0.012 
(0.046) (0.092) (0.043) 
MR, 0.044* 0.071** 0.047* 
(0.026) (0.027) (0.027) 
TVE, 0.102*** 0.112*** 0.099** 
(0.037) (0.042) (0.041) 
/, 0.214*** 0.180*** 0.215*** 
(0.063) (0.065) (0.044) 
PRIM, -0.048 0.099 -0.039 
(0.044) (0.099) (0.056) 
D, 1.413 4.510** 1.842 
(1.139) (1.832) (1.138) 
Constant 3.139 - 3.247 
(3.042) - (3.450) 
No. of observations 330 330 330 
Adjusted R-squared 0.186 0.261 0.181 
LM heteroscedasticity 5.924" 3.927" 5.502" 
[0.015] [0.048] [0.019] 
Durbin-watson 1.635 1.939 1.623 
Jarque-Bera Test 687.837 864.043 -
[0.000] [0.000] 
Ramsey's reset2 1.548 3.332 -
[0.214] [0.069] 
Hausman's specification test 26.622 97.518 55.928 
[0.002] [0.000] [0.000] 
Note: 
1. Standard errors are in parentheses, while p-values are in brackets. *** denotes statistical 
significance at the 1 percent level, while ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 5 and 10 
percent level respectively. 
2. Based on the F-statistics reported in table 6.11, the fixed-effects model is chosen. 
3. h : The standard errors of the variables are heteroskedastic-consistent. 
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Table 6.12 Estimation Results of Model Al 
Model Simple Pooling Fixed-effects Random-effects 
ln(r,�’) -0.063*** -0.103*** -0.080*** 
(0.013) (0.023) (0.017) 
DIST -0.226*** - -0.293** 
(0.051) - (0.129) 
F S J -0.003 -0.052 -0.025 
(0.040) (0.069) (0.038) 
磁 0.036* 0.073*** 0.048** 
(0.021) (0.023) (0.022) 
j^yg 0.098*** 0.123*** 0.102*** 
(0.026) (0.037) (0.035) 
J 0.210*** 0.158** 0.198*** 
^ I 
(0.054) (0.062) (0.036) 
-0.042 0.126 -0.009 
(0.034) (0.088) (0.050) 
D, 1.960** 4.499*** 2.500*** 
(0.913) (1.362) (0.856) 
Constant 3.964 - 3.258 
(2.609) - (3.034) 
No. of observations 304 304 304 
Adjusted R-squared 0.317 0.500 0.294 
LM heteroscedasticity 6.215 h 4.245 ” 4.594 h 
[0.013] [0.039] [0.032] 
Durbin-watson 0.567 0.852 0.541 
Jarque-Bera Test 80.037 130.004 -
[0.000] [0.000] 
Ramsey's reset2 2.021 5.838 -
[0.156] [0.016] 
Hausman's specification test 48.662 94.339 29.984 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Note: 
1. Standard errors are in parentheses, while p-values are in brackets. *** denotes statistical 
significance at the 1 percent level, while ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 5 and 10 
percent level respectively. 
2. Weighted moving average data = + 2 X X “ + ) / 4 are employed. 
3. Based on the F-statistics reported in table 6.11，the random-effects model is chosen. 
4. h : The standard errors of the variables are heteroskedastic-consistent. 
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Figure 2.1 Map of Guangdong 
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Source: www.paulnoll.com/China/Provinces/Province-Guangdong.html. 
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